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ARTICLES
WHAT CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING SAYS
TO CATHOLIC SPONSORS OF CHURCH
PLANS
Alison M. Sulentic*
As we enter the third millennium, men and women, especially in
the poorest countries, are unfortunately still deprived of access
to health services and the essential medicines for their
treatment. Many of our brothers and sisters die each day of
malaria, leprosy and AIDS, sometimes in the midst of the
general indifference of those who could or should offer them
support. May your hearts be attentive to these silent pleas! It is
your task, dear members of Catholic medical associations, to
work so that every person, regardless of his social or economic
status, can exercise his primary right to what is necessary for
restoring his health and thus to adequate medical care.'
- Pope John Paul II (July 7, 2000)
The Holy Father may not have had the citizens of the United States in
mind when he spoke these words at an international Jubilee gathering of
Catholic doctors in July 2000. The United States obviously does not stand
among the "poorest countries, 2 and, while AIDS is rife in our country,
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author would like to thank Dean Nicholas Cafardi of Duquesne University School
of Law for the opportunity to participate in the Jubilee Conference. Ms. Sulentic
is grateful to Duquesne University School of Law for a summer stipend in support
of the research on which this article is based and to Debra Yost for her research
assistance.
1. John Paul II, Holy Father to Catholic Doctors' Congress - Consistent
Witness to the "Gospel of Life" 4 in L'OSSERVATORE ROMANO (July 19, 2000)
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-pYii-spe_20000707_catholic-
doctors-en.html (last visited July 19, 2000).
2. See, e.g., WORLD BANK ORGANIZATION http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-
query (last visited Oct. 16, 2000) (noting United States is ranked the sixth in world
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malaria and leprosy do not pose a threat to most Americans with anything
close to the fear they inspire in nations with less sophisticated health
systems.' Nonetheless, the United States health insurance system does
challenge the ability of an uninsured or underinsured person to "exercise
his primary right to what is necessary for restoring his health and thus to
adequate medical care."4 Most Americans under the age of sixty-five are
enrolled in health insurance plans that are maintained by the employer of
a family member. As a result, an American's struggle to obtain payment
for the level of medical services that he or she desires must often take
place in the field of employee benefits. However, the strong preemption
clause of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) poses a significant threat to the enforcement of claims based on
state law.6 In the United States, therefore, whether a person may obtain
access to and payment for "what is necessary for restoring his health
and... adequate medical care"7 implicates two important issues: first,
whether there is a right to a just wage, and, second (and more
particularly), how the notion of a just wage is affected when health
insurance benefits are offered as part of a compensation arrangement.
This article addresses, in very narrow terms, the concept of a just wage
in terms of per capita gross national product); see generally John Maggs, Much
Better Than Just Good, THE NATIONAL JOURNAL (Jan. 16, 1999).
3. See Appendix A, infra.
4. John Paul II, supra note 1, 4. See generally JENNIFER A. CAMPBELL, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, PUB. No. P60-208, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 1998 (1999)
(noting 44.3 million persons or 16.3% of United States population lacked health
insurance during the entire 1998 calendar year); JOHN M. MCNEIL, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, PUB. No. P70-44, THE EFFECT OF HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE ON
DOCTOR AND HOSPITAL VISITS: 1990-1992 (1995); EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, ISSUE BRIEF No. 224, THE WORKING UNINSURED: WHO
THEY ARE, How THEY HAVE CHANGED AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF BEING
UNINSURED (Aug. 2000) available at http://www.ebri.org/ibex/ib224.htm (last
visited Sept. 26, 2000) (discussing the fact that 83.2% of the 43.9 million non-
elderly uninsured Americans were members of a family with a working head of
household); EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, ISSUE BRIEF NO. 217,
SOURCES OF HEALTH INSURANCE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNINSURED:
ANALYSIS OF THE MARCH 1999 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (Jan. 2000)
available at http://www.wbri.org/ibex/ib217.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2000)
(indicating that 18.4% of non-elderly population were uninsured).
5. See, e.g., CAMPBELL, supra note 4, at 1-2 (noting that part-time workers are
more likely to be uninsured than full-time workers).
6. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000).
7. John Paul II, supra note 1, T 4.
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as it has developed in modern Catholic social teaching. The United
States workplace has sometimes been slow to recognize the parameters of
what it means to offer a just wage 9 and our courts have generally been
loathe to recognize an absolute right to health care.1° In contrast, the
social teachings of the Roman Catholic Church are not nearly so vague.
The article proposes that a self-consciously Catholic notion of justice"
must form the basis for the response of an institutional Catholic
employer 12 to the civil law issues involved in the design and operation of a
private employee health benefit plan in the United States. For the
Catholic employer, choices concerning the design of employee health
8. This article adopts the term "Catholic social teaching" to refer to the
collection of papal encyclicals, conciliar documents and episcopal teachings that
address the Roman Catholic Church's understanding of and role in promoting
justice in society. An explanation of the term "Catholic social teaching" and other
names applied to this body of work is presented in Richard P. McBrien, An
Ecclesiological Analysis of Catholic Social Teachings in CATHOLIC SOCIAL
THOUGHT AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER - BUILDING ON ONE HUNDRED YEARS
147, 147-48 (Oliver F. Williams & John W. Houck eds., 1993). See also William J.
Byron, Ten Building Blocks of Catholic Social Teaching, 179(13) AMERICA 9 (Oct.
31, 1998).
9. See, e.g., Harry Hutchinson, Toward A Critical Race Reformist Conception
Of Minimum Wage Regimes: Exploding The Power Of Myth, Fantasy, And
Hierarchy, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 93 (1997); William P. Quigley, The Right To
Work And Earn A Living Wage: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 2 N.Y.
CITY L. REV. 139, 166-169 (1998); William P. Quigley, 'A Fair Day's Pay For A
Fair Day's Work': Time To Raise and Index the Minimum Wage, 27 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 513 (1996).
10. See, e.g., Wideman v. Shallowford Comm. Hosp., 826 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir.
1987).
11. See generally Lucia Ann Silecchia, On Doing Justice & Walking Humbly
with God: Catholic Social Thought on Law as a Tool for Building Justice, 46
CATH. U. L. REV. 1163 (1997); Lawrence A. Plutko, Pursuing Justice in an Era of
Managed Care. Seattle-based System Makes Roof for the Underserved and
Uninsured, 78 HEALTH PROGRESS 37 (1997) available at http://www.chausa.org
(last visited Sept. 27, 2000).
12. Throughout this article, the term "Catholic employer" is used to describe
an institutional employer whose affiliation with the Catholic Church is sufficiently
strong to enable the employer to qualify for the church plan exemption described
in Section 3(33) of ERISA. Thus, while a Catholic person might find that the
same principles have bearing on his or her own employment-related decisions, this
article is not specifically addressing the moral ethics that might govern such a
person's duties in a secular corporation or in his or her own personal life. See
generally James Martin, The Business of Belief, 183(1) AMERICA 16 (2000).
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benefit plans cannot be viewed as morally neutral, economically driven
business decisions. The Catholic employer must take into account the
social teachings of the Catholic Church,13 which, in turn, means coming to
grips with the church's understanding of a just wage.
These social teachings must inform the most basic decision that a
Catholic employer makes in the operation of his or her employee benefit
plans: whether to offer his or her employees a plan that is subject to
ERISA's protections and obligations or to claim exemption from both,
electing to retain church plan status. Unlike the compensation
arrangements offered by secular employers, employee benefit plans that
are sponsored by churches and certain church affiliates may qualify as
"church plans" under Section 3(33) of ERISA and Section 414(e) of the
14Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (Code). A plan that qualifies as a
church plan is normally exempt from the requirements of ERISA, as well
as from many of the requirements of the Code. 5 On the other hand, the
administrator of a church plan may elect to treat the plan as an ERISA
plan and, by extension, to comply with any applicable provisions of the
Code. 6 This prerogative - the choice to avoid or adhere to ERISA - is
unique to the administrators of church plans.7
The plan administrator's decision regarding this issue defines not only
the extent to which governmental regulation may intrude into the design
and administration of the plan, but also the nature of the participants'
13. See generally Dennis Brodeur, Guidance for a Failing System Catholic
Social Teachings Provide the Needed Principles, 76 HEALTH PROGRESS 30 (1995)
available at http://www.chausa.org (last visited Sept. 27, 2000); NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, Sharing Catholic Social Teaching: Challenges
and Directions
http://www.nccbuscc.org/sdwp/projects/socialteaching/socialteaching.html (last
visited Sept. 16, 2000).
14. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) § 3(33), 29
U.S.C. § 1002(33) (2000); 26 U.S.C. § 414(e) (2000).
15. See, e.g., ERISA § 4(b)(2) (1999), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(2) (2000); 26 U.S.C.
§ 410(c) (2000).
16. See, e.g., ERISA § 4(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(2); 26 U.S.C. § 410(d).
17. Legal scholarship on church plans is not prolific. See, e.g., Wendy Gerzog
Shaller, Churches and Their Enviable Tax Status, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 345 (1990).
There are, however, some very useful materials that have been published by
practitioners in this area. See, e.g., Glenn R. Drury, Employee Benefits Law H §
15S.1 et seq., EBLII IL-CLE 15 S-1 (1994, 1997 supp.); G. Daniel Miller, Health
Care Acquisitions and Dispositions: Church Benefit Plan Issues, SD18 ALI-ABA
587 (Sept. 10, 1998) (continuing legal education materials); Terry A.M. Mumford,
Church Plans: The Statutory Framework, SC14 ALI-ABA 165 (Sept. 11, 1997)
(continuing legal education materials);
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rights under the plan and the manner in which they may be enforced. The
"church plan election" thus offers the occasion for sponsors of eligible
plans to judge whether the civil legislation governing employee benefits
adequately comports with the obligations prescribed by their religious
missions. It is, of course, possible that such a decision might be based
solely on the estimated impact of ERISA compliance on the employer's
balance sheet. However, viewed in the context of Catholic social
teachings, the decision-making process may also be seen as presenting the
employer with two valuable topics for ethical and theological reflection.
First, the decision to accept or reject the church plan exemption patently
requires the church-affiliated employer to examine the viability of his or
her business goals; in other words, the employer must obviously consider
the extent to which the choice to remain exempt from ERISA or to
subject his or her plans to ERISA regulation burdens his or her ability to
accomplish his or her corporate objectives. The second consideration,
however, is the extent to which this choice fulfills the employer's
obligations to his or her employees within the mandates of his or her
religious affiliation. It is this second opportunity which is the primary
focus of this article. To put the issue in the terms made popular by
Vatican II, the church plan election is yet another instance in which the
church must consider its response to the modern world."
This article does not attempt to place the same issue within the
traditions of other religions or, indeed, within the framework of the larger
secular society. Instead, its parameters are limited to the articulation of
the Roman Catholic tradition set forth in the social teachings of the
hierarchical magisterium.'9 One should note, of course, that the concerns
of justice in the field of employee benefits are not solely of interest to
Roman Catholics; nor is it necessary that such concerns be analyzed
exclusively in terms of the Roman Catholic tradition. Moreover, even
when discussion is limited to the Roman Catholic tradition, it would be
18. See generally PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN
WORLD, in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN I 199, $ 2, at 200 (Walter M. Abbott
ed., Joseph Gallagher trans. ed., 1966) (also known as GAUDIUM ET SPES) ("For
the Council yearns to explain to everyone how it conceives of the presence and
activity of the Church in the world today.").
19. Within the Catholic tradition, the term "magisterium" may refer, in its
broadest sense, to the teaching authority of the entire "People of God." In this
article the term is used in its most narrow sense to refer to "the teaching authority
of the pope and the other bishops." RICHARD P. MCBRIEN, CATHOLICISM 64-66
(2d ed. 1994) (defining hierarchical magisterium).
2000]
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na'fve to ignore the voices that call for a new understanding of Roman
Catholicism and its impact on the well being of workers."' The broader
scope of these issues, however, is not the focus of this article. Instead, this
article asks Roman Catholic employers to listen to the radical cry for
justice that resounds within the most orthodox of Roman Catholic
teachings - the papal encyclicals and the conciliar and episcopal
documents of the modern era - and to answer that plea in the responsible
administration of employee benefit plans. Once this cry is heard,
interpreted and answered by Roman Catholic employers, we can perhaps
begin to ask where the weaknesses in this tradition might be found and
what this tradition, as well as the critique articulated by its dissenters,
might say to those who make decisions in the secular employment world.
For now, however, this article strictly addresses the tenets of the social
teachings that have been promulgated by the hierarchy itself and their
application to the employee benefits issues faced by institutional Catholic
employers.
A secondary theme is addressed to lawyers who actively represent
20. This article does not focus, for example, on the critique of democratic
capitalism, which is certainly a relevant subject for consideration in light of
Catholic social teachings. See Dennis P. McCann, Toward a Theology of the
Corporation: A Second Chance for Catholic Social Teaching in CATHOLIC SOCIAL
THOUGHT AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER - BUILDING ON ONE HUNDRED YEARS,
supra note 8, at 329, 331 (critiquing Michael Novak's concept of the theology of
the corporation as "a religious legitimation of the system sustaining [business
organizations], namely, democratic capitalism"). Nor is the theological critique
offered by liberation theology or the theology of religious pluralism the focus of
my discussion. See generally John L. Allen, Exclusive Claim B New Vatican
Document Asserts Superiority of Christian Faith and Catholic Church, 36(3)
NAT'L. CATH. REP. 3 (Sept. 15, 2000).
Instead, the article's more narrow focus offers an opportunity for Catholics to
reflect upon "and make sense of their own vocation within [democratic capitalism]
and its role in fulfilling God's purpose in history." Id. In other words, we
momentarily turn our attention towards living out Catholic social teachings in day-
to-day business decisions. This does not mean that the social economy of our
society is to be accepted, but rather to ask how a Catholic employer should
operate his or her business within the society in which he operates. Another way
to say this, in a specifically Catholic language, would be to say that this article is
asking us to reflect on the transformative power of grace in our immediate
surroundings. That transformation is indeed likely to recur at the larger level of
society. However, for the Catholic employer who is faced with making business
decisions for his or her own corporation, there is some value to asking how that
grace might operate in the daily work which he performs. See generally Rembert
Weakland, "Economic Justice for All" 10 Years Later, 176(9) AMERICA 8 (Mar.
22, 1997).
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religiously affiliated institutions. The representation of a religiously
affiliated institution requires the lawyer to bridge the gaps between his or
her client's religious mission and its secular aspirations. This task
demands not only an expertise in secular law, but also an appreciation of
the theological dimensions of the social mission of the religion with which
the institution is affiliated, as well as its self-governing ordinances. The
necessity of understanding the interplay between civil law and theology
surfaces at least twice in the analysis of a Catholic employer's decisions
with regard to the establishment of an employee benefit plan. First,
secular law determines which organizations may elect special treatment as
"church plans" under ERISA or the Code. It is therefore imperative that
an understanding of this term in its secular context prevail in order to
safely establish whether an organization is eligible for church plan status
under civil law. This is not to say that religious organizations should place
the secular definition of a "church plan" at the forefront of their
institutional planning.2  Rather, the decision-makers for the religious
organization should fully understand the bearing that their institutional
structures will have on their ability to qualify for special treatment under
ERISA and the Code. Second, once a religious organization has
established its eligibility to exercise "church plan" status, whether or not it
should do so is an issue that must be informed by the organization's
21. See Melanie DiPietro, S.C., The Interfacing of Canonical Principles and
American Law in the Negotiation of Joint Ventures Between Church-Related and
Non-Church-Related Corporations 181, 186-87 ("Whether... a public juridic
person or a private juridic person or other canonical association, there is a formal
nexus to the Church and all are bound by the same faith and discipline which
forms membership in the Church.") in ACTS OF THE COLLOQUIUM - PUBLIC
ECCLESIASTICAL JURIDIC PERSONS AND THEIR CIVILLY INCORPORATED
APOSTOLATES (E.G., UNIVERSITIES, HEALTHCARE INSTITUTIONS, SOCIAL SERVICE
AGENCIES) IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE U.S.A.: CANONICAL - CIVIL
ASPECTS (Pontifical University of Saint Thomas Aquinas and Duquesne
University School of Law 1998) (proceedings of conference held Apr. 24, 1998 in
Rome, Italy); see also Sister Melanie DiPietro, Remarks at the Jubilee
International and Ecumenical Canon Law Conference (Feb. 5, 2000). See generally
ADAM J. MAIDA & NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI, CHURCH PROPERTY, CHURCH
FINANCES AND CHURCH-RELATED CORPORATIONS 103-15 (2d ed. 1988)
(discussing the relationship of canon law and civil law);
22. Id. at 132 (suggesting that the Roman Catholic Church cannot "accept" a
description of itself as a "voluntary association" analogous to a labor union under
civil law and that "[t]here is a genuine danger in acquiescing in legal descriptions
of the Church that do not jibe with ... ecclesial policy").
2000]
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mission or, to put it in terms more familiar to Roman Catholics, its
apostolate. The ethical dimensions of this decision must be considered in
mindful awareness of the religious tradition within which the religious
organization operates.23
I. EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS OF RELIGIOUSLY AFFILIATED
INSTITUTIONS
A. What is a church plan?
The term "church plan" appears deceptively simple. In the everyday
jargon of the employee benefits world, where acronyms such as QDRO
24
and QMCSO 25 abound, the terms "church" and "plan" seem refreshingly
straightforward. A "church" is a church and a "plan" is a plan; ergo, a
"church plan" must be a plan sponsored by a church. Right? Wrong. In
fact, the term is not nearly as straightforward as the familiarity of its
component words suggests. Embedded in the term "church plan" are two
highly technical, yet elusive, definitions- that of a "plan" and that of a
"church." In combination, they join to create a third term which defines
the scope of the church plan exemption.
1. What is a plan?
The first of these terms, "plan," has plagued plan sponsors and their
26attorneys for years. The statutory definition of the term is frustratingly
circular. Section 3(3) of ERISA states:
The term 'employee benefit plan' or 'plan' means an employee
welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a
plan which is both an employee welfare benefit plan and an
employee pension benefit plan.
23. See F. Giba-Matthews, A Catholic Lawyer and the Church's Social
Teaching, 66 FORD. L. REV. 1541 (1998) (discussing the social justice
responsibilities of the Catholic lawyer).
24. See ERISA § 206(d)(3)(B)(i) (1999), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i) (2000)
(defining qualified domestic relations order).
25. See ERISA § 609(a)(2)(A) (1999), 29 U.S.C. § 1169(a)(2)(A) (2000)
(defining qualified medical child support order).
26. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107 (1989) (policy to
reimburse employees for accrued but unused vacation time is not a plan). See
generally Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Implementing ERISA: Of Policies and "Plans," 72
WASH. U. L. Q. 559 (1994); Peter J. Wiedenbeck, ERISA's Curious Coverage, 76
WASH. U. L.Q. 311 (1998).
27. ERISA, § 3(33) (1999), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(11) (2000).
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While ERISA offers some indication as to how one might go about
distinguishing between a welfare plan and a pension plan, that is the end
of the statutory guidance regarding the nature of a "plan" itself. Not
surprisingly, the courts have stepped in to help us understand the nature
28
of this somewhat ephemeral concept. In Fort Halifax Packing v. Coyne,
for example, the Court held that a plan was something more than a one-
time payout of state-mandated severance pay. By using the term "plan",
the Court reasoned, Congress must have intended to refer to an
arrangement that, as a bare minimum, required an ongoing administrative
scheme." Massachusetts v. Morash3° similarly emphasizes the
administrative continuity that is required in order for a plan to be present.
In Donovan v. Dillingham, the Eleventh Circuit elaborated on this notion,
explaining that the prescient observer would discern the existence of a
plan if he were able to "determine whether from the surrounding
circumstances a reasonable person could ascertain the intended benefits,
beneficiaries, source of financing, and procedures for receiving benefits."'"
One might easily adapt Donovan v. Mercer's analysis of the term
"fiduciary" to provide the essence of the Donovan v. Dillingham court's
analysis of the term "plan" in the most forceful terms: "If it [t]alks [l]ike a
[d]uck... and [w]alks [1]ike a [d]uck... [iut is a [d]uck.
3 2
Once one has obtained an understanding of the term "plan," however,
one must still appreciate the nuances of this term that are peculiar to
employee benefits law. In Section 3(3) of ERISA, we receive the
somewhat disconcerting news that a "plan" can be an "employee welfare
plan," an "employee pension benefit plan," or "a plan which is both an
employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan.
3
The statute sketches the broad parameters of the first two categories.
An employee welfare plan is perhaps most easily identified, as the
statute clearly lists the categories of benefits that may be provided by such
a plan.34 Chief among the statutory examples are health insurance
28. Fort Halifax Packing v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
29. See id. at 12.
30. Massachusetts ,. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115-16 (1989) ("The distinguishing
feature of most of these benefits is that they accumulate over a period of time and
are payable only upon the occurrence of a contingency outside of the control of
the employee.").
31. See Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1373 (11th Cir. 1982).
32. Donovan v. Mercer, 747 F.2d 304, 308-09 (5th Cir. 1984).
33. See ERISA § 3(3) (1999), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (2000).
34. See ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) ("[A] medical, surgical, or hospital
2000]
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benefits ("medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits")," disabilityS36
benefits and employer-sponsored life insurance. As a welfare plan, an
employer-provided health insurance arrangement is subject to the
provisions of ERISA pertaining to disclosure obligations and fiduciary
standards. However, in the absence of a contractual obligation
undertaken by the employer, or a federal statutory mandate, a welfare
plan is not required to provide any particular level of benefits and, indeed,
may be terminated at any time by the employer."
In contrast to the bullet-point definition of an employee welfare plan,
the statute's definition of a pension plan is more functional in nature.
Under ERISA, an employee pension benefit plan is "any plan, fund, or
program" which "provides retirement income to employees" or "results in
a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the
termination of covered employment or beyond."39 In common usage, the
term "pension plan" often refers to traditional defined benefit pension
plans, to which an employer makes contributions in order to fulfill its
obligation to provide definitely determinable benefits to vested
employees upon their retirement. 4" However, the term, as used in
ERISA, may also address defined contribution plans which permit both
the employer and/or the employee to make contributions to an individual
account on the employee's behalf.41 In this case, an employee's benefit is
based on the fulfillment of the employer's promise to make contributions
pursuant to a "definite predetermined formula., 42 Whether articulated as
care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or
unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or
day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any benefit
described in § 302(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (other than
pensions on retirement or death, and insurance to provide such pensions)").
35. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
36. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
37. See ERISA §§ 101-104 (1999), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-24 (2000) (disclosure
provisions); ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (fiduciary provisions).
38. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 75 (1995).
39. See ERISA § 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2).
40. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (2000).
41. ERISA § 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2); 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(ii) (2000).
42. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(ii); ERISA § 3(17), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(17)
(definition of a special account plan); see also Malbon v. U.S., 43 F.3d 466, 470-71
(9th Cir. 1991); see generally PETER J. WIEDENBECK & RUSSELL K. OsGooD,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 134 (1996) (explaining the
differences between the terminology of ERISA and the tax law with respect to
pension plans).
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defined benefit plans or defined contribution plans, most pension benefit
plans are subject to detailed requirements regarding the funding, vesting
and distribution of benefits, in addition to the rules regarding disclosure
and fiduciary obligations to which all ERISA plans are subject.43
A further explanation of the language in which employee benefits
professionals speak of the different forms of pension benefits is in order.
An arrangement that meets the definition of an "employee pension
benefit plan" may also offer both the sponsor and the plan participants a
variety of tax advantages, provided that the plan is structured and
operated as a "qualified" plan under the strictures of the Code. 44 An
employee pension plan that does not comply with the Code's qualification
requirements is known as a "non-qualified" plan. 5 One should be clear
that the terms "qualified" and "non-qualified" do not carry a moral or
ethical significance; there is no disgrace in maintaining a non-qualified
plan.46 A non-qualified employee pension plan may be perfectly in
compliance with any applicable ERISA requirements. 47  Moreover, in
some circumstances, a non-qualified plan may be the most appropriate
compensation arrangement to meet the needs of an employer and its
employees.4 The terms "qualified" and "non-qualified" simply refer to
the status of the plan for purposes of evaluating the income tax
consequences to the plan sponsor and to the participants.
2. What is a church?
In using the term "plan", we enter into a world of jargon; yet, debates
about the term's meaning are at least familiar to lawyers whose work
43. See, e.g., ERISA § 302 (1999), 29 U.S.C. § 1082 (2000) (funding rules for
pension plans); ERISA §203(a) (1999), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (2000) (vesting rules
for pension plans); ERISA § 206 (1999), 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (2000) (form and
payment of benefits for pension plans); ERISA §§ 101-04., 29 U.S.C. § 1021-1024
(2000) (disclosure); ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (fiduciary rules).
44. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(7).
45. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 83 (2000); see also 26 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1) (2000).
46. A qualified plan that has lost its tax-qualified status is known as a
"disqualified" plan. See, e.g., Buzetta Construction Corp. v. I.R.S., 92 T.C. 641, 653
(1989).
47. See generally Gary E. Jenkins, Designing Top Hat and Other Nonqualified
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requires them to bandy it about.49 The same cannot necessarily be said of
the term "church" when it is used in conjunction with the term "plan."
The easy use of this term by both ERISA and the Code invites reflection
on two issues that shape any understanding of the term "church plan."
First, what is the meaning of "church?" Second, how does the term
"church" apply to institutions, such as social services agencies or hospitals
that are closely affiliated with churches? Neither ERISA nor the Code
provides a satisfactory answer to these preliminary issues.' °
It might be tempting, if a tad irreverent, to suggest that we simply go
back to Donovan v. Mercer: if it talks like a duck and walks like a duck, it
is a duck. Yet, for the purpose of defining a church plan, the fact that an
employer looks and sounds like a church suggests only two features that
might help establish the employer's eligibility to sponsor a church plan;
neither individually nor collectively are these features dispositive of the
issue. Indeed, tax litigation has already explored the potential for tax
abuse that lies within a system that permits groups to identify themselves
as churches without further objective analysis of their goals.51 The
regulations and jurisprudence interpreting ERISA and the Code do not
permit an organization's self-identification as a church to be the sole
factor in determining whether the organization qualifies for legal status as
a church." In other words, an organization's internal understanding of the
definition of a church is relevant to, but not dispositive of its status as a
church for purposes of ERISA and the Code.
How then are we to understand what the term "church" means for the
secular purpose of determining whether a plan qualifies for special
treatment under ERISA and the Code? The ambiguity of the word
"church" - which we use in daily life to describe a physical location, an
organization of people, an assembly for worship - is obvious even if one is
49. See generally Wiedenbeck, ERISA's Curious Coverage, supra note 26, at
333.
50. See Charles M. Whelan, "Church" in the Internal Revenue Code: The
Definitional Problems, 45 FORD. L. REV. 885, 887-88 (1977); David A. Pratt, Very
Serious Business: Sense and Nonsense under Section 403(b) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1197, 1120 (1996) (noting use of different
definitions of church in the Internal Revenue Code); Wendy Gerzog Shaller,
Churches and Their Enviable Tax Status, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 345, 350 (1990)
("Congress has never provided a very helpful definition of a 'church'....").
51. See generally William A. Drennan, Note, Bob Jones University v. United
States: For Whom Will the Bell Toll?, 29 ST. Louis U. L.J. 561 (1985); See also
Stephen Senn, The Prosecution of Religious Fraud, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 325,
n.29 (1990).
52. See text accompanying n. 109, infra.
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not pondering what ERISA or the Code might have to say about the
matter. When we refer to a "church," are we talking about a place, a
group of people, or an activity? Moreover, which places, people or
activities might be described as "churches?" What are the common ties of
ideology and property that bind places, people or activities together in a
way that makes them a "church?" Finally, how can regulatory agencies
and courts ruling on church plans within the strictures of the First
Amendment and the Establishment Clause, distinguish among fraudulent
and legitimate claims to church identity?
This is a secular question which demands a secular response. The
message of this article - that Catholic social teaching can and should have
a bearing on a Catholic employer's decisions regarding employee benefits
- is hardly compatible with the suggestion that it is wise to leave one's
religion at the church exit. However, an attorney who is trying to
establish church plan status on behalf of his or her client might indeed be
wise to abandon his or her own faith-based conception of "church" in
order to fully appreciate both the generality and the details of the working
definition applied by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). In establishing
a plan's eligibility for church plan status, the issue is not whether the
sponsor of the plan falls within a set of theologically defined precepts; the
issue is instead whether it meets the secular precepts established by the
IRS in fulfillment of its mandate to administer the Code. One may safely
posit that the First Amendment and the Establishment Clause require, at
a minimum, that "church plan" status be available to a variety of faith-
based organizations without demanding that they adhere to one particular
understanding of how a corporate faith group should be organized.53
The problem becomes immediately apparent if one considers whether a
Jewish synagogue or an Islamic mosque qualifies as a "church" for
purposes of ERISA or the Code. Although Congress' use of the term
"church" does seem to derive from language originating in the Christian
tradition, it is unlikely that Congress or the government's regulatory
agencies could fulfill the constitutional obligation of neutrality in the face
of religious diversity if they were to adopt a definition that was strictly
Christian in concept, thereby excluding synagogues or mosques from
attaining the preferential status accorded to churches. Even within the
Christian tradition, a definition of the term "church" which is based on
53. See generally Carl H. Esbeck, A Restatement of the Supreme Court's Law
of Religious Freedom: Coherence, Conflict or Chaos, 70 N.D. L. REv. 581, 592-613
(1995) (explaining current status of law of religious freedom).
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theological principles seems an inherently inappropriate tool for
distinguishing between organizations that may validly claim status as a
"church" under ERISA and the Code and those that may not. Each
Christian denomination answers the question "what is church?" in its own
manner and many of these answers are not compatible with other
approaches. The government cannot honor its obligation to uphold
neutrality in the face of different religions if the definition of the term
"church" is drawn from within the tradition of one religion in a manner
that excludes such qualification for organizations with different belief
systems.
a. Theological definitions of "church": Catholicism as a
case study
Conflating a theological understanding of "church" with the secular
conception of the term as it is employed in ERISA and the Code leads to
an unnecessary degree of confusion in determining which entities are
actually eligible to make a church plan election. In essence, in a
pluralistic society like the United States, any theological definition of the
term "church" is likely to raise serious difficulties if it becomes the sole
standard which determines the secular legal rights of a variety of faith-
based organizations. If theology defines which organizations qualify as
churches and which do not, someone - no matter how holy their persons
or how sincere their beliefs - will be left out in the cold. From a
theological perspective, it may be both necessary and appropriate to
understand the set of beliefs that mark some organizations as orthodox
and identify others in a different category. Yet the simple fact that one
organization might fail to meet the requirements for conformity with the
religious expectations implicit in a theological definition of church does
not mean that it should necessarily be treated differently under secular
law as well. In a religiously pluralistic society governed by secular law,
one cannot safely import theological constructs into an analysis of
whether an organization qualifies as a church for secular legal purposes.
To do otherwise would be to prioritize the theology of those who happen
to adhere to the chosen definition of church and to deprive theological
dissidents of their secular rights simply because they do not conform to
the structure mandated by the dominant theology.
Consider, for example, the theological definition of "church"
articulated by the hierarchical magisterium of the Roman Catholic
Church as a hypothetical definition for the term "church" as used in
[Vol. 17:1
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ERISA and the Code." One must, of course, acknowledge that there is
not a consensus on the theological significance of "church" either within
the larger Christian tradition in general or within the Roman Catholic
tradition in particular. Within Catholicism, for example, Richard
McBrien distinguishes between an "ecclesiology 'from above,"' which is
identified with Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger among others55 and reflected in
the CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, and an "ecclesiology 'from
below,"' which is reflected in the work of more contemporary
ecclesiologists such as Hans Kung.16 Ecclesiology "from above" regards
the "church" as a "'communion of saints' created and sanctified by the
Holy Spirit."57 Ecclesiology "from below," on the other hand, posits the
"nature of the Church as an earthly community of human beings who...
have a mission in and for the world that includes, in addition to the
preaching of the Word and the celebration of the sacraments, the struggle
on behalf of justice, peace, and human rights. 58 Assume, for purposes of
argument, however, that we were to adopt the more traditional "top-
down" view of "church" that is reflected in the writings of the hierarchical
magesterium as our working definition of "church" for purposes of
ERISA and the Code. Would this be a wise, useful or just strategy?
Would it even be compatible with Catholic social teaching itself?
Let us start with the most basic elements of Catholic ecclesiology. In
the CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH,5 9 we learn that
[i]n Christian usage, the word "church" designates the liturgical
54. Of course, it would neither be responsible nor defensible to suggest that
the more traditional ecclesiology advocated by the hierarchical magesterium is
alone unsuitable for use as a definition of "church" for secular purposes.
However, since this article focuses on the hierarchy's teachings regarding social
justice, I have chosen to examine the definition of church that is at work in the
same writings. I have similar reservations about the use of any theologically based
definition in a secular context.
55. See McBrien, supra note 8, at 691-92 (stating that Joseph Ratzinger and
Hans Urs von Balthasar identify the roots of "ecclesiology from above" in the
Second Vatican Council).
56. See, e.g., HANS KUNG, THE CHURCH 129 (Ray and Rosaleen Ockendon
trans. 1967) ("If the Church is the people of God, it is clear that the Church can
never be merely a super-entity poised above real human beings and their real
decision."); see generally McBrien, supra note 8, at 695-96 (analysis of Hans
Kung's contribution to Catholic ecclesiology).
57. Id. at 705-06 (quoting Hans Urs von Balthasar).
58. Id. at 692.
59. Id. at 715.
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assembly, but also the local community or the whole universal
community of believers. These three meanings are inseparable.
"The Church" is the People that God gathers in the whole
world.6°
The CATECHISM recognizes the difficulty of distinguishing a term that
refers to a place and an activity ("the liturgical assembly") and to "the
local community."'" Yet it answers the question "What is a church?" in a
strikingly universal or "catholic" way: "'The Church' is the People that
God gathers in the whole world." 62 Despite the acknowledgment that
God's call might resound among those who are not Catholics, however, a.
strict reading of the rhetoric in which the CATECHISM is presented
suggests that it is within the Roman Catholic Church that the "Church of
Christ" "subsists.,
63
The CATECHISM is not the only authoritative church document to
articulate this position. In analyzing the notion of "church", for example,
the Second Vatican Council did not stray from the proposition that the
Roman Catholic Church was the sole custodian of the "Church of Christ."
In the DOGMATIC CONSTITUTION OF THE CHURCH, popularly known as
LUMEN GENTIUM," the Second Vatican Council explained:
[T]he unique Church of Christ which in the Creed we avow as
one, holy catholic, and apostolic.... constituted and organized in
the world as a society, subsists in the Catholic Church, which is
governed by the successor of Peter and by the bishops in union
with that successor...."
LUMEN GENTIUM clearly reserves to the Roman Catholic tradition the
ability to qualify without limitation as "the Church of Christ. 6 6 In
Catholic doctrine, "the Catholic Church alone has all the institutional
elements which are necessary for the integrity of the Body of Christ...-- . \ ,67
(e.g., the Petrine ministry, the seven sacraments)."
It is, of course, important to understand the hierarchy's insistence on a




64. LUMEN GENTIUM in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 8, at 23 (Walter
M. Abbott ed., Joseph Gallagher trans. ed. 1966).
65. Id.
66. This position seems at odds with that of a variety of contemporary
Catholic theologians, including the analysis put forward by Richard McBrien. See
MCBRIEN, supra note 8, at 723.
67. Id. at 732.
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theology predicated on the institutional fullness of "the Catholic Church
alone" in the context of modern ecumenical developments. In the past
forty years, both the Catholic laity and the Catholic hierarchy have
actively sought and found encouragement in ecumenical dialogue." The
Second Vatican Council certainly did not close its eyes to the existence of
other Christian denominations. 69 The Council took great strides in
proclaiming the importance of ecumenism and this advance in interfaith
relations resounds throughout the CATECHISM.7 ° The Council pointed out
that all Christians who are baptized - whether Catholic or not - are part of
the "People of God."7 Several of the writings that emerged since Vatican
II struggled with similar issues.72 How can this desire "that all might be
one" 73 be reconciled with a definition of "church" that seems to point,
with little dissimulation, to the Roman Catholic Church as the full and
correct expression of Christian life on earth?
74
In part, the answer might be found in the tight bonds between Catholic
ecclesiology and Catholic eschatology. In the broadest sense, Christians
are defined and unified by their common belief in the messianic status of
Jesus of Nazareth. Yet, in the twenty-first century of Christian belief, it is
clear that Christian identity is experienced in a variety of Protestant faith
communities that remain outside the Catholic Church. Louis Bouyer, a
68. See generally Thomas P. Rausch, The Unfinished Agenda of Vatican H,
172(21) AMERICA 23 (June 17, 1995) (discussing status of ecumenism).
,69. See generally, McBrien, supra note 8, at 388-89 (summarizing teachings of
Vatican II with respect to religious pluralism); id. at 673-74 (summarizing
Council's teachings on ecumenism).
70. See, e.g., UNITATIS REDINTEGRATIO in DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN 1I, supra
note 64, 4, at 347 ("This sacred Synod, therefore, exhorts all the Catholic faithful
to recognize the signs of the times and to participate skillfully in the work of
ecumenism.").
71. See JAMES A. CORIDEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CANON LAw 55 (1991).
72. See, e.g., JOHN PAUL II, UT UNUM SINT
www.vatican.va/holy-father/ohn-paYf.jp-ii-enc 25051995_ut-unum-sinten.html
(last visited Oct. 19, 2000).
73. Id. 1 1 (translation of Latin phrase "ut unum sint").
74. See, e.g., UNITATIS REDINTEGRATIO in DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II, supra
note 64, 3, at 346 ("For it is through Christ's Catholic Church alone, which is the
all-embracing means of salvation, that the fullness of the means of salvation can
be obtained."). It is important to note, however, that the Latin terminology
employed in the cited sentence quotes directly from the Holy See's condemnation
of the radical views of Father Leonard Feeney, a Boston priest who claimed that
salvation was impossible outside the Catholic Church. See id. at n.18.
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Protestant who converted to Catholicism, devoted much attention to
explaining the points of commonality and difference between the two
broad categories of Christian experience. Drawing on the theology of
Karl Barth, Bouyer described the essence of Protestant theology as "[a]
conception of the Word as an act of God, who seeks out and pursues us,
as a creative and recreative act in whose very outpouring we encounter
the world of the new creation in Christ; this discovery of the Word as the
presence of God with us and finally as the very Person of the Incarnate
Son of God., 75 For Bouyer, the basic difference between Protestantism
and Catholicism emerges not from disagreement over the integral
importance of the Scriptures, but rather from setting "the authority of
Scripture in opposition to the authority of the Church. 76  Bouyer
suggested that Roman Catholicism does recognize Scripture as "the sole
sovereign authority Y in questions of doctrine." 77  However, unlike
Protestants, Roman Catholics view the church as possessing the authority
that is necessary to interpret scripture in a way that leads individuals to
full salvation.8 Thus, for Catholics, "Scripture keeps its true and
complete sense only when it remains a vital part of that living tradition of
75. See Louis BOUYER, THE WORD, CHURCH AND SACRAMENTS IN
PROTESTANTISM AND CATHOLICISM 19 (A.V. Littledale trans. 1961); see also
Louis BOUYER, THE SPIRIT AND FORMS OF PROTESTANTISM 122 (A.V. Littledale
trans. 1956) ("For the objection often made, that Protestantism tends to replace a
living religion with the religion of a lifeless book, misunderstands the very essence
of Protestantism; a collective experience, ever sought after and renewed, of a life
discovered and maintained by familiarity with the Bible, is the very opposite of a
bookish devotion."). For additional reflection on the importance of the theology
of Karl Barth, see id. at 124-128.
76. See BOUYER, THE WORD, CHURCH AND SACRAMENTS, supra note 75, at
26.
77. Id. at 53; see also BOUYER, THE SPIRIT AND FORMS OF PROTESTANTISM,
supra note 75, at 130-31.
78. See BOUYER, THE WORD, CHURCH AND SACRAMENTS, supra note 75, at
46-47 ("This is the only thing that the Catholic Church claims when it claims
authority for its tradition and hierarchy.... [I]t does assert that it is the very
community to which the apostles communicated the Spirit of Christ so that the
kerygma of Christ might be preserved therein .... And, at the same time, it does
affirm that its bishops... have been established by the apostles themselves, not
to... put forward a new teaching, but to continue to proclaim with the same
authority that the apostles received from God in Christ the same Gospel and in
particular to correct and rectify all the adulterations it might undergo in a
community which is still human .... "); see also JOHN PAUL II, UT UNUM SINT,
supra note J 66, at 72 (describing the Catholic Church's "authentic teaching
office" with regard to scripture).
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the Church in which the inspired writers actually composed it."79
According to this line of reasoning, the Roman Catholic Church assumes
a unique role in transmitting the message of salvation because it alone is
the authentic custodian of the church of the apostles and its concomitant
authority to interpret the Word of God in a way that leads individuals to
salvation.8° This integral link between ecclesiology and eschatalogy
explains how the Roman Catholic Church recognizes that non-Catholic
Christians are authentic in their faith and belong to the Church of Christ,
while at the same time reserving to itself the authority to offer individuals
the full path to redemption and union with Jesus.
The Council's teachings in LUMEN GENTIUM touched on "the very
delicate point of the relationship of the Catholic Church as it presently
exists.., to the Church of Christ in order to explain this distinction:
According to the Constitution, the Church of Christ survives in
the world today in its institutional fullness in the Catholic
Church, although elements of the Church are present in other
Churches and ecclesial communities. 82
In UNITATIS REDINTEGRATIO,83 for instance, the Council noted that
Christians are found "not merely as individuals but also as members of
the corporate groups in which they have heard the gospel, and which each
regards as his Church and, indeed, God's."84 These "corporate groups,"
which UNITATIS REDINTEGRATIO later refers to as "separated Churches
and Communities," are not in full communion with the Roman Catholic
Church through which, according to UNITATIS REDINTEGRATIO, "the
fullness of the means of salvation can be obtained. 8 1 While urging
Catholics "to acquire a more adequate understanding of the distinctive
doctrines of our separated brethren,"86 the Council drew a clear
distinction between those Christians who are in full communion with the
79. Id. at 53-54.
80. See, e.g., UNITATIs REDINTEGRATIO $ 3 in DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II,
supra note 64, at 346. See also JOHN PAUL II, VERITATIS SPLENDOR 27 available
at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paYI enc_06081993_veritatis-
splendor-en.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2000).
81. LUMEN GENTIUM, supra note 64, at n.23 (editorial note).
82. Id.
83. UNITATIs REDINTEGRATIO in DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II, supra note 64,
[1 at 341.
84. Id. 1, at 342.
85. Id. 91 3, at 346.
86. Id. 9, at 353.
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Roman Catholic Church and those who are not. According to the
Council, Orthodox Christians, through "their entire heritage of
spirituality and liturgy, of discipline and theology, in their various
traditions," participated in "the full catholic and apostolic character of the• , . .. ,88
Church."87 However, despite the "special affinity and close relationship"
between Protestant and Catholic Christians, the Council found that
differences of opinion regarding holy orders and the "reality of the
Eucharistic" ministry precluded Protestants from being in full communion
with the Catholic Church.89
In spite of the many advances in ecumenical dialogue that have taken
place since the Second Vatican Council, 90 the hierarchical magisterium has
continued to distinguish between the Catholic Church, which is in full
compliance with its understanding of the term "church," and other
Christian denominations. In its recent declaration entitled DOMINUS
IESUS,9  the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith reiterated this
point, in declaring:
The Churches which, while not existing in perfect communion
with the Catholic Church, remain united to her by means of the
closest bonds, that is, by apostolic succession and a valid
Eucharist, are true particular Churches. .. .On the other hand,
the ecclesial communities which have not preserved the valid
Episcopate and the genuine and integral substance of the
Eucharistic mystery, are not Churches in the proper sense .... 2
The hierarchical magisterium's understanding of "church," then, as
promulgated in the documents of the Second Vatican Council and as
further explained in the DOMINUS IESUS, would not recognize the full
participation of many Protestant denominations in a form that would
qualify as "church" and certainly would not be applicable to non-
Christian religious communities.
87. Id. 17, at 360.
88. Id. 1[ 19, at 361.
89. UNITATIS REDINTEGRATIO in DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II, supra note 64,
1f 22, at 363-64.
90. See generally UT UNUM SINT, supra note 72, IT 59-61, at 71-73.
91. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, "DOMINUS IESUS": ON THE
UNICITY AND SALVIFIC UNIVERSALITY OF JESUS CHRIST AND THE CHURCH (2000),
available at http://www.vatican.va/roman-curia/congreg.. .cfaithdoc_20000806
_dominus-iesusen.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2000).
92. UNITATIS REDINTEGRATIO in DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II supra note 64,
11, at 359.
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This distinctly Catholic definition of "church" as "God's only flock" 93
does not seem to coexist peacefully with the more pluralistic notion of
"church" or, indeed, in many expressions of Christian thinking outside the
writings of the hierarchical magisterium14 To require full compliance with
the magisterium's understanding of "church" would require full
communion with the Catholic Church, including acceptance of the
teaching authority of the hierarchical magisterium, the Petrine tradition of
apostolic succession and Catholic teachings concerning the Eucharist.9
These positions have numbered among the most persistent obstacles to
uniting Roman Catholicism with the expressions of Protestant
Christianity that are most closely tied to Roman Catholic spirituality.96 If
one were to demand that all faith-based organizations comply with the
understanding of "church" that is implicit in the writings of the Roman
Catholic hierarchy, it is certain that non-Christian religious organizations
would fail the test and that most, if not all, Protestant denominations
would be unable to meet the precepts which are most central to the
hierarchy's understanding of church. Ecumenism remains a goal, rather
than a reality, in the modern world.
If ecumenism has not been achieved in religious life, there is no reason
to expect that a theologically based definition of church would function
within constitutional constraints in secular life: The expectation of
universality implicit in saying that the Catholic Christian believes in a
church that is "one, holy, catholic and apostolic" 97 does not lend itself to
the secular purposes of ERISA's church plan provisions in the United
States' modern-day pluralistic society. Such a definition would exclude
those religious denominations which do not share Catholic beliefs from
qualifying as a "church" for purposes of maintaining a "church plan."
Moreover, it is doubtful that the exclusion of some religious organizations
from the obligations and benefits imposed on other religious
organizations by civil law would be compatible with the hierarchical
93. Id. $ 2 at 344.
94. See, e.g., Avery Dulles, The Papacy for a Global Church, 183(2) AMERICA
6 (July 15, 2000); Ladislas Orsy, The Papacy for an Ecumenical Age, 183(12)
AMERICA 9 (OCT. 21, 2000).
95. See, e.g., UNITATIs REDINTEGRATIO in DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II, supra
note 64, 22, at 364.
96. See generally John Borelli, Renewal for Anglican-Roman Catholic
Relations, 183(5) AMERICA 1215 (Aug. 26, 2000).
97. LUMEN GENTIUM in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II, supra note 64, 8,
at 23.
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magisterium's published writings on ecumenism." If the hierarchy is
willing to recognize that the "People of God" might include those who are
not in full communion with the Roman Catholic Church,99 it is very
doubtful that their call for respect for the dignity of all people'°° could be
harmonized with any policy that categorically excluded non-Catholics
from attaining secular rights accessible to those who are in communion
with the Catholic Church.
If the CATECHISM'S definition of "church" is "the whole world," or if
the mainstream Protestant religions derive their definition as "the
community of believers," how is secular government to distinguish
between legitimate and fraudulent claimants seeking church plan status?
The answer, simply, is that it cannot. The far-reaching spiritual and moral
aspirations of an organization which calls itself a "church"-which,
although illustrated by the CATECHISM'S definition of the term, are hardly
limited to Roman Catholicism-simply do not constitute an adequate
definition for purposes of designating which institutions are eligible to
receive special treatment under secular law as sponsors of church plans.
To adopt the definition of "church" promoted by one denomination -
such as that present in the CATECHISM - would threaten to exclude other
denominations from the benefits of this status. Stated differently, a
denominational definition of "church" does not meet the governments'
obligation to act within the confines of the First Amendment. The
definition of a "church" for purposes of ERISA is required to stretch
across denominational differences, while allowing the government to
distinguish between organizations that merit the protection offered by the
First Amendment and those that do not.
b. Sociological definition of "church"
Sociological explanations of the term "church" may serve somewhat
better as a secular test for church status, but they pose their own points of
98. See, e.g., GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 18, j 26, at 225 ("there must be
made available to all men everything necessary for leading a life truly human,...
[including] the right to employment"); id. 29, at 227-28 ("[W]ith respect to the
fundamental rights of the person, every type of discrimination, whether social or
cultural, whether based on sex, race, color, social condition, language, or religion
is to be overcome and eradicated as contrary to God's intent."); id. 40, at 239
("[T}he Catholic Church gladly holds in high esteem the things which other
Christian Churches or ecclesial communities have done or are doing ... ").
99. See, e.g., UNITATIs REDINTEGRATIO in DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II, supra
note 64, 3, at 345.
100. See, e.g., GAUDIUM ET SPES, supra note 18, 26, at 225.
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frailty when pressed into use as concepts to delineate an organization's
status under ERISA or the Code.01 Sociological analysis addresses the
range, development and meaning of human behavior in different social
arrangements, while the concern of those struggling with qualification as a
church under ERISA and the Code is merely in demonstrating that a
particular organization demonstrates enough external characteristics to fit
into a predetermined concept of what a church might be. Both the
perspective and the objectives of the sociologist and the attorney differ in
this regard.
Durkheim, for example, saw the term "church" as a sociological
construct: "A Church is not a fraternity of priests; it is a moral community
formed by all the believers in a single faith, laymen as well as priests."' '
While Durkheim recognized the necessary element of "community" in his
understanding of "church," he drew the boundaries of that community in
accordance with the common beliefs of the faithful. The language of this
definition is similar to, but clearly more narrow than that of the
Catechism. For Durkheim, members of a church are drawn together by
their common belief system; he explained,
A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to
sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden-
beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral
community called a Church, all those who adhere to them.0 3
Adherence to common beliefs thus distinguishes between the members
of a "church" and outsiders. Thus, for Durkheim, many different systems
of belief and rituals might qualify as churches as long as they demonstrate
adherence to an integrated belief system. However, Durkheim's system
also implies that church status hinges, to some degree, on the members'
sincerity of belief-a concept that may be more amenable to
measurement for the purposes of sociology than for the purposes of the
assessment of tax-exempt status by a governmental body constrained to
act within the neutrality prescribed by the First Amendment..
Weber also considered the sociology of religious behavior and offered a
101. For a critique of Weber's analysis of church, see, e.g., DIETRICH
BONHOEFFER, SANCTORUM COMMUNIo: A THEOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE
SOCIOLOGY OF THE CHURCH 255-260 (Reinhard Krauss and Nancy Lukens trans.;
Joachim von Soosten ed. [German], Clifford J. Green ed. [English] 1998)
(published as DIETRICH BONHOEFFER WORKS, VOL. I).
102. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE 61
(Joseph Ward Swain, trans. 1915).
103. Id. at 62.
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distinction between a 'sect' and a 'church.' Had Weber been able to read
the text of the CATECHISM that was published in 1994, he would perhaps
not have been surprised to see the far-reaching aspirations of the
CATECHISM'S definition of "church." In his analysis of civil or secular life,
Weber proposed a distinction between "voluntary" and "compulsory"
associations.'04  In a voluntary association, "established order claims
authority over the members only by virtue of a personal act of
adherence."' 5 In a compulsory association, "the established order... has,
within a given specific sphere of activity, been successfully imposed on
every individual who conforms with certain specific criteria."' 6 Weber
thought that "[i]n the religious sphere, the corresponding types are 'sect'
and 'church."' 1 He explained:
It is its character as a compulsory association, particularly the
fact that one becomes a member of the church by birth which
distinguishes a church from a "sect." It is characteristic of the
latter that it is a voluntary association and admits only persons
with specific religious qualifications9
Weber found it "normal for a church to strive for complete imperative
control on a territorial basis and to attempt to set up the corresponding
territorial or parochial organization." Yet, like Durkheim, Weber's
concern was primarily in understanding the behavior of human beings
when they function in such associations, rather than with the nature of the
church itself. In this light, it is easy to understand why Weber could easily
analogize the concept of a church to that of a compulsory association.
Without further investigation into the religious qualifications that define
membership characteristics, this definition would not serve the
government's purpose - distinguishing between true and fraudulent
churches - in an efficacious manner. Not only would compulsory
membership be possible in an organization that was not a church, but
many organizations which would be classified as "sects" under Weber's
analysis would likely be promising candidates for tax-favored status in
terms of the Code's tax treatment of churches.
c. IRS' definition of church
The working definition of a church that is currently employed by the
104. See generally MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 151-152 (A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans. 1947).
105. Id. at 151.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 152.
108. Id. at 157.
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IRS has more in common with the sociological understanding of church
entities than with the religious definitions. Sociology, like the IRS and
unlike theology, has little interest in demonstrating the verity of the
religious truths that bind a church together. Yet, unlike the sociological
explanations, the Service's working definition is not as accepting of the
quality of belief or the nature of membership criteria as the indicator of
correct "church" status. The Internal Revenue's Manual of Guidelines
for Exempt Organizations lists the following criteria, which stress the
functions, rather than the beliefs, that might be found in a religiously
affiliated organization:
(a) a distinct legal existence;
(b) a recognized creed and form of worship;
(c) a definite and distinct ecclesiastical government;
(d) a formal code of doctrine and discipline;
(e) a distinct religious history;
(f) a membership not associated with any other church or
denomination;.
(g) a complete organization of ordained ministers ministering to
their congregations;
(h) ordained ministers selected after completing prescribed
courses of study; .,
(i) a literature of its own;
(j) established places of worship;
(k) regular congregations;
(1) regular religious services;
(m) Sunday schools for the religious instruction of children;
(n) schools for the preparation of its mlnsters.
Like many of the IRS's bullet-point tests,n1 this test is multifaceted and
does not identify any single criterion as dispositive in the identification of
which organizations are properly classified as churches. Despite the easy
fit between most mainstream Christian congregations and the list of
109. IRS Manual 7(10)(69) Exempt Organizations Guidelines Handbook, §
321.3, cited in Glenn Drury, Employee Benefits Law II, § 15.67; Karen B. Kotner
& Leslye G. Laderman, Defined Benefit Plans of Churches and State and Local
Governments, 372 BNA TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIOS A-7 n.62 (1990).
110. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 (1987) (setting forth a 20-factor
test for determining independent contractor status).
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criteria,"' it is noteworthy that the IRS does not require adherence to any
particular denominational belief system in order for an organization to
qualify as a church. Although the IRS does require that an organization
that is qualifying as a "church" have "a recognized creed and form of
worship," the list of criteria focuses on external, form-related
characteristics of the religiously affiliated organization rather on the depth
of the individual adherent's convictions. Moreover, the list of
characteristics assumes that a church will meet regularly at established
places for worship, thus limiting (if not, indeed, precluding) the possibility
that an individual could realistically hope to establish a "church" in the
absence of community activity or that a group might constitute a church
without the regular practice of worship. Indeed, the IRS's analysis seems
to focus on external indicators of the regular "church-like" behavior of a
group of persons rather than on litmus tests for faith on an individualized
basis.
B. What is a "church plan" and when is it eligible for special
treatment under ERISA?
The basic definitional elements that we have already addressed do not
solve the problem of determining which arrangements qualify as church
plans. The fact that a "plan" is sponsored by a "church" does not
necessarily mean that the plan may safely be called a "church plan" as
defined in Section 3(33) of ERISA. 112 Even the basic definition of a
"church plan" which is set forth in Section 3(33)(A) of ERISA extends
the complexity of the analysis beyond simply finding a "church" and
looking for a "plan." Section 3(33)(A) imposes the additional
requirements that the sponsor of a plan must be a "church" or
"association of churches" exempt from taxation under Section 501 of the
Code and that the plan be maintained (within certain limits) for the
benefit of the church's employees.
1. Opening the Church Doors: Who is a Church Employee?
As addressed above, the term "church" brings plenty of ambiguity to
the term "church plan" merely by distinguishing between an organization
that qualifies as a "church" for tax-purposes and one that does not. The
definition of a "church plan," however, intriguingly widens the category of
organizations that might appropriately serve as the sponsor of a church
111. See, e.g., Lutheran Soc. Servs. of Minn. v. United States, 758 F.2d 1283
(8th Cir. 1985).
112. ERISA, § 3(33) (1999), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(A) (2000).
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plan beyond "churches" per se. There are two main ways in which
Section 3(33) broadens the class of appropriate sponsors beyond the class
of "churches."
First, a church plan, as described in Section 3(33)(A) of ERISA, is not
simply a plan maintained by a church; it also includes a plan that is
sponsored by a "convention or association" of churches. Glenn Drury has
suggested that this term is "an ambiguous one, to be relied on with
caution by the practitioner attempting to qualify for church plan status
under ERISA.""' 3  The IRS originally interpreted the concept of a
''convention or association of churches" as a "cooperative undertaking by
churches of the same [or differing] denominations."1 1 4 However, the
definitional significance of this position may be somewhat overstated. In
Lutheran Social Services of Minnesota v. United States,"5 the Eighth
Circuit examined the legislative history of the provision and determined
that the language derived from a request that these provisions be drafted
in a way that reflected "congregational" as well as "hierarchical"
churches."6 Regardless of the origins of the phrase, the term "convention
or association of churches""' 7 opens the opportunity of plan sponsorship
to groups of churches whose common bonds are tied more loosely than
might be true with respect to an organization that clearly qualifies as a
church in its own right.
Second, ERISA Section 3(33)(C)(ii)(II) also provides that the term
"employee of a church or a convention or association of churches
includes.., an employee of an organization, whether a civil law
corporation or otherwise, which is exempt from tax under section 501 of
Title 26 and which is controlled by or associated with a church or a
convention or association of churches."1 8  Thus, employees of an
organization "controlled by or associated with a church or a convention or
association of churches"' 9 are eligible to participate in a church plan as
long as a number of requirements are met.
This language dates from the Multiemployer Pension Plan
113. Drury, supra note 109, § 15.68.
114. Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 74-224, 1974-1 C.B. 61 (1974)).
115. Lutheran Soc. Serv. of Minn. v. United States, 758 F.2d 1283, 1288 (8th
Cir. 1985).
116. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-09092, 1982 PRL Lexis 604 (1983).
117. ERISA, § 3(33)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(A).
118. ERISA, § 3(33)(C)(ii)(II), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(A).
119. ERISA, § 3(33)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(A).
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Amendments Act of 1980.2 In its absence, employees who worked for
church affiliates, rather than as direct employees of a church, were
ineligible to participate in a church-sponsored plan.1 Thus, a secretary
directly employed by a church might have been eligible to participate in a
church plan, but a secretary employed by a primary school affiliated with
that church would have been covered by a plan that was required to meet
the requirements of ERISA and the Code. 122  In practical terms,
compliance with the requirements of ERISA and. the Code most likely
imposed a financial and legal burden on the school's sponsorship of a
plan, while the church plan exemption relieved the church's plan of this
burden. 12 It was entirely possible that the church would have been able
to find the resources to permit its secretary and its other employees to
participate in a church plan, while the affiliated school might only have
been able to offer benefits to its employees if its resources were
sufficiently robust and its philosophy sufficiently compatible with
government requirements to enable it to meet the additional burdens
imposed by ERISA and the Code on a plan that was not eligible for the
church plan exemption. The impact of Congress's decision to amend the
language of ERISA Section 3(33) in order to permit employees of tax-
exempt church affiliates to participate in plans that would qualify for the• 124
church plan exemption should not be underestimated. This seemingly
insignificant change of words now permits church-affiliated hospitals,
120. Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-364, §
407 (1980).




124. Note that the Internal Revenue Service's regulations on church plans
specifically provide that for purposes of evaluating church plan status, "... the
term 'church' includes a religious order or a religious organization if such order or
organization is (1) an integral part of a church, and (2) is engaged in carrying out
the functions of a church, whether as a civil law corporation or otherwise." Treas.
Reg. §1.414(e)-l(e) (2000); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.511-2(a)(3)(ii) (2000).
However, prior to the enactment of the Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act of 1980, the Internal Revenue Service did not exercise infinite
patience with the religious orders of the Roman Catholic Church. The De La
Salle brothers, for example, could not qualify as a church within the meaning of
these regulations after it was determined that their main activities included the
operation of a winery rather than more traditional religious functions. See
generally De La Salle Institute v. United States, 195 F.Supp. 891 (N.D. Cal. 1961);
see also Chapman v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 358 (1967); see generally General
Counsel Mem. 39007, 1983 WL 197946 (1983).
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nursing homes, universities and other charities to offer benefits within the
125
church plan exemption.
Grasping the significance of this development is critically important to
the task of understanding how the church plan exemption works in the
context of a modern corporation that advertises itself as "Catholic." First,
the statute requires that the benefit plan of an organization that seeksS 126
church plan status be "controlled by or associated with" the church. It
is important to note that these requirements are alternative, rather than
cumulative. Direct control is a fairly common notion ,in the analysis of
• • 127
corporate relationships of nonprofit organizations; if the diocese owns
and operates a seminary under the authority of the bishop, control is
surely present. However, the notion that a mere "association" is sufficient
to enable an institution's plans to achieve church plan status is an
important broadening of the class of potential benefit plan sponsors. In
order to qualify as being "associated" with a church, the institution needs
to demonstrate only that it shares "common religious bonds and
convictions" with the church, not that a direct line of ownership or
institutional control by the church itself is present. Administrative
decisions frequently cite adherence "to the tenet and teachings of the
Church" and sharing "common religious bonds and convictions with the
129
Church" as sufficient evidence of such association.
The importance of this highly nuanced distinction between "control"
and "association" to the Roman Catholic tradition emerges quite clearly
when the institution that aspires to claim church plan status for its
employee benefit arrangements is affiliated with a Roman Catholic
religious order. In the United States, a religious order,"O while owing
125. See generally General Counsel Mem. 39007, supra note 124; General
Counsel Mem. 39793, supra note 121.
126. Treas. Reg. § 1.414(d)(2) (2000) (emphasis added).
127. See, e.g., Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act § 8.01(b), as cited in
MARILYN E. PHELAN, 3 NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES: CORPORATIONS, TRUSTS,
ASSOCIATIONS app. E (West 2000); 26 U.S.C. § 414(c) (defining controlled group
of corporations).
128. On the incorporation of various diocesan functions and the desirability
of various degrees of control by the diocese, see generally MAIDA AND CAFARDI,
supra note 21, at 133-34 ("The principle to follow is the following: the greater legal
risk an activity carries, the greater the need to give that activity its own legal
identity.").
129. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul., 92-209A, 1992 WL 67322, *4.
130. A religious order is a canonically recognized group of men or women
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certain canonically defined duties to the local bishop or to the Holy See,"'
may be separately incorporated under civil law and generally may hold
its property separately from that of the diocese in which it operates.
3
1
Moreover, the apostolic works of the religious order- such as a hospital or
school system operated by the order - may also be separately
incorporated. 134  Therefore, there may not be a direct ownership
who live in communal life and service to the Catholic Church. In modern canon
law, religious orders are called "religious institutes." See MAIDA AND CAFARDI,
supra note 21, at 42. The term "religious institute," as used in canon law, refers to
"a society in which members, according to proper law, pronounce public vows...
and live a life in common as brothers or sisters." 1983 Code C. 607 § 2.
131. See 1983 Code C. 589 (describing the difference between institutions of
pontifical right and those of diocesan right); see also NEW COMMENTARY ON THE
CODE OF CANON LAW 172 (ed. John P. Beal, James A. Coriden, Thomas J. Green)
(2000) [hereinafter NEW COMMENTARY] ("Which laws are applicable to a
particular church-related institution depends upon the canonical status of the
institution."); MAIDA AND CAFARDI, supra note 19, at 41-52; Francis G. Morrisey,
Catholic Identity in a Challenging Environment, 80 HEALTH PROGRESS 38 (1999),
available at http://www.chausa.org/PUBS/PUBSART.ASP?ISSUE'HP0011&
ARTICLE'D (last visited Sept. 25, 2000).
132. See NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 131, at
139 ("Most religious institutes active in the United States have taken action to
incorporate themselves.").
133. See generally 1983 Code C. 634, § 1 (religious institutes "are capable of
acquiring, possessing, administering, and alienating temporal goods"); NEW
COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 131, at 798-99 (indicating
that superiors of religious institutes must "ensure that their ownership is
safeguarded through civilly valid methods," including, in the U.S., incorporation
under civil law and through the separate incorporation of apostolic works).
134. An example of the sophisticated structure of modern religious orders
may be found in Op. No. 92-09A, 1992 WL 67322 (E.R.I.S.A.) (1992)
(determining that plan was eligible for church plan status). The Poor Sisters of St.
Francis Seraph of Perpetual Adoration, Province of St. Joseph incorporated a
nonprofit civil corporation to hold the assets of the order. Id. In 1981 the order
established the Franciscan Healthcare Corporation of Colorado Springs (FHCCS)
as a tax-exempt nonprofit civil corporation. Id. In 1989 FHCCS merged with
another nonprofit organization controlled by the Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati,
Ohio, members of an unrelated order. Id. The two orders shared control of the
merged corporation.
The merged corporation sponsored a defined benefit plan in which employees at
eight other facilities participated. Five of these entities were separately
incorporated in their own right under the control of their own parent corporations
or the holding corporation. Both the parent corporations and the holding
corporations were controlled by the order. The remaining facilities were not
separately incorporated.
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connection recognizable in civil law between the local bishop and a
hospital that is separately incorporated and operated by a religious order.
Although canon law considers the property "public juridic persons"'3
persons such as religious orders to be "ecclesiastical goods,"' the legal
ownership of such entities and the right, under civil law, to make decisions
on their behalf may vest in the religious order, and not directly in the local
church hierarchy. M The element of "control" may very well be missing in
such arrangements.
Despite the possibility that "control" might be lacking, the element of
"association" may still be present. A two-step analysis must therefore
take place in order to determine whether the employees of these
institutions may properly participate in church plans by virtue of their
employer's "association" with the Roman Catholic Church. First, the
relationship between the hierarchical Roman Catholic Church and the
order itself must be examined. In analyzing this relationship, the
Department of Labor (DOL) has usually concluded that they share
"common religious bonds and convictions with the church.', 3 8 Many
opinion letters generally treat the analysis of an order's "religious bonds
and convictions" somewhat gingerly, if not exactly with reverence. In
many cases, the DOL notes that the Order itself is listed in the Catholic
Directory, an indication that the DOL generally accepts the hierarchy's
official determination of which organizations actually share its religious
convictions.'39
For discussion of the modern corporate structure of religious institutes, see
generally Maida and Cafardi, supra note 21, at 155-62; Peter Campbell, Evolving
Sponsorship and Corporate Structures. Canon Law Considerations for Changing
Organizations, 76 HEALTH PROGREss 35 (1995) available at http://www.chausa.org
(last visited Sept. 12, 2000).
135. 1983 C. 116, § 1.
136. 1983 C. 1257, § 1.
137. See generally MAIDA AND CAFARDI, supra note 21, at 75-76.
138. See, e.g., Op. No. 86-03A, 1986 WL 38843 (E.R.I.S.A.) (1986).
139. See e.g., id. at *1. The reliance on the Catholic Directory is consistent
with the notion that an organization bearing the name "Catholic" is in fact
associated with the Roman Catholic Church. Note, for example, that Canon 803,
§ 1 provides that "[a] Catholic school is understood as one which a competent
ecclesiastical authority or a public ecclesiastical juridic person directs or which
ecclesiastical authority recognizes as such through a written document." 1983
Code C. 803, § 1. Canon 803, 3 goes on to provide that "[ejven if it is in fact
Catholic, no school is to bear the name Catholic school without the consent of
competent ecclesiastical authority." 1983 Code C. 803, § 3. See generally J. Michael
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While the IRS and the DOL are not given to discoursing on the
canonical organization of Catholic employers, understanding the basic
elements of canon law may prove helpful in demonstrating that sufficient
140association is present for purposes of Section 3(33) of ERISA. This is
particularly true due to the fact that the organizational structure of a
Catholic employer is dictated not only by the requirements of civil law,
but also by the strictures of canon law. Understanding the employer's
status under canon law permits the observer to gain an understanding of
the extent to which it is subject to direct ecclesiastical control by the
Roman Catholic hierarchy. For example, some commentators suggest
that "the level of perceived Catholicity" is higher when the canonical
status of a Catholic hospital prescribes a close relationship between the
hierarchy and the hospital in question.14 This perception seems directly
relevant to establishing sufficient "association" with the Roman Catholic
Church to enable such an organization to claim church plan status.
The canon law of the Roman Catholic Church recognizes not only
"physical persons," but also "moral persons" and "juridic persons." The
NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW explains that
[a] moral person is a group or succession of natural persons who
are united by a common purpose and, hence, who have a
particular relationship to each other and who, because of that
relationship may be conceived of as a single entity.' 42
Fitzgerald, The Official Catholic Directory: Civil and Canon Law Requirements, 30
CATH. LAW. 107 (1986).
140. See generally NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW, supra
note 131; MAIDA AND CAFARDI, supra note 21.
141. On the general issue of Catholic identity, see generally MAIDA AND
CAFARDI, supra note 19, at 158 ("[T]he establishment of a corporate philosophy,
the statements of corporate purpose and structure in articles and bylaws, and the
effectuation of this philosophy and legal structure by the trustees are the major
source of the corporation's Catholic identity."); Morrisey, supra note 131.
The controversial apostolic constitution, Ex CORDE ECCLESIAE, issued by John
Paul II in 1990, addresses the issue of Catholic identity in the context of Catholic
universities. The encyclical mandates the active engagement of the local Bishop in
overseeing the Catholic law school's adherence to the mandates of Catholic
teachings in general and to Ex CORDE ECCLESIAE in particular. See Apostolic
Constitution, ON CATHOLIC UNIVERSITIES: Ex CORDE ECCLESIAE (1990),
available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/apost-
constitutions/documents/hf-jp-ii-apc_15081990 ex-corde-ecclesiae en.html (last
visited Sept. 15, 2000); see generally David L. Gregory, The Bishop's Role in the
Catholic Law School, 11 REGENT U. L. REV. 23 (1999) ("[T]he integral role of the
Bishop in the life of the Catholic law school is not negotiable.").
142. See NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 131, at
Catholic Sponsors of Church Plans
The rights or obligations that devolve upon moral persons are, in fact, the
rights and.obligations of the individuals who compose the group.14' A
moral person might "also be understood as an accumulation or mass of
material goods or assets which have been set aside for a common purpose
and which, therefore, can be conceived of as a single entity, as, for
example, a fund, such as a pension ... fund.'
144
In contrast, Canon 113, explains that juridic persons are the "subjects in
canon law of obligations and rights which correspond to their natures."
Roughly analogous to the concept of a corporation in American civil law,
a juridic person is "an artificial person... constituted by competent
ecclesiastical authority for an apostolic purpose, with a capacity for
continuous existence and with canonical rights and duties like those of a
natural person (e.g., to own property, enter into contracts, sue or be
sued).' ' 145 The Code of Canon Law further divides the category of juridic
persons into "public" and "private"; a public juridic person, being more
closely associated with the church hierarchy, acts "in the name of the
Church," possesses assets identified as "ecclesiastical goods," and fulfills
"entrusted functions ... pursuant to a mission received from hierarchical
authority and under the close supervision and direction of hierarchical
authority.', 146 In contrast, a private juridic person acts in its own name and
its assets are not construed as church property subject to all of the
• • t, • 147
prescriptions of canon law.
It is important to understand that under canon law, institutions such as




145. Id. at 155; see also MAIDA AND CAFARDI, supra note 21, at 22.
146. NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 103, at
162. See MAIDA AND CAFARDI, supra note 21, at 10 (all church property is owned
by one public juridic person or another and all property held by public juridic
persons is church property); Id. at 75-84 (explaining the concept of ecclesiastical
goods).
147. See NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 131, at
162; see generally 1983 Code C. 115; NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON
LAW, supra note 131, at 159-61 (explaining the status of juridic persons); 1983
Code C. 116; NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 131,
at 161-62 (explaining the difference between private and public juridic persons);
MAIDA AND CAFARDI, supra note 21, at 21-29 (examining the status of public
juridic persons under canon law and explaining that private juridic persons are "a
rare and little-used entity" in the American Catholic Chuch).
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the Roman Catholic Church may be organized in a variety of canonically
acceptable structures.'9 Under canon law, for example, a Catholic
hospital might be organized as a "public juridic person" in its own right
and, as such, subject to the requirements of canon law with respect to
public juridic persons, including the understanding that the assets of the
hospital would be "ecclesiastical goods."'' 49 It is also possible that a
hospital might be organized merely as the apostolic work of a sponsoring
public juridic person whose assets and liabilities, for purposes of canon
law, belong to its sponsor (and thus are "ecclesiastical goods")."" In the
alternative, a Catholic hospital may be structured as a "private juridic
person" owing less accountability to the authority of the hierarchy and
possessing assets that do not meet the strict requirements of
"ecclesiastical goods.''. Finally, it is possible that a hospital might simply
be organized as a "private association of the faithful," the assets of which
are held by the private association and deemed to be the joint assets of
the members for purposes of canon law. Although it is not necessary
for a hospital to be organized as a public juridic person in order to make a
persuasive case that it is associated with the Catholic Church, the stronger
canonical ties will likely present the most convincing factual argument for
a finding of association.'53
One might perhaps generalize that for purposes of demonstrating to
the IRS or to the DOL that the institution under examination possesses a
degree of association that satisfies the statute's mandate, a Catholic
employer operating as a public juridic person in its own right or as the
apostolic work of a religious order which is itself a public juridic person
148. See generally NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW, supra
note 131, at 173-74.
149. Id. at 173; see, e.g., Nancy Mulvihill, Public Juridic Person Ensures
Catholic Presence. How One Catholic Healthcare System Assumed a Lay Model of
Sponsorship, 77 HEALTH PROGRESS 25 (1996), available at http://www.chausa.org/
PUBS/PUBSART.ASP?ISSUE=HP9601&ARTICLE=C (last visited Nov. 17,
2000).
150. See NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 131, at
173 (noting that the "vast majority" of Catholic hospitals in the United States fall
into this category). See also MAIDA AND CAFARDI, supra note 19, at 25-26 (noting
that "[tihe canonical understanding of public juridic persons is a holistic one" and
"includes all apostolic activities of the public juridic person" even when such
activities have been separately incorporated under civil law).
151. NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 131, at
174.
152. Id. at 174.
153. See generally Melanie DiPietro, supra note 21, at 187.
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under canon law would make a stronger case than an employer that
operates as a private association of the faithful or a "de facto" Catholic
institution. 114 Consider again the example of a Catholic employer that is
operated as the separately incorporated apostolic work of a religious
order. For purposes of the Code and ERISA, once the order's association
with the church is established, the second step of the analysis is to
determine whether the order exercises sufficient control over the
separately incorporated institution which it owns or operates. In general,
the DOL has found that sufficient association is present when the board
of trustees of the civil corporation is comprised of members of the
order."' The IRS has issued opinion letters that similarly construe the
requisite element of control.'
For instance, the New York Province of the Sisters of Mercy
established a skilled nursing facility that later became part of the Eastern
Mercy Health System, a tax-exempt nonprofit membership corporation."'
The major superiors of the Mercy Sister's eight provinces were the
members of Eastern Mercy Health System.' In turn, Eastern Mercy
became the sole member of the skilled nursing facility.59 The DOL found
that the order was an integral part of the Roman Catholic Church and
that its structure under civil law insured that it exercised control over the
skilled nursing facility.' 6°
In Op. No. 95-10A, the DOL found sufficient association to be present
in the governance of a Jesuit university that was separately incorporated
by the order, even though the corporate bylaws of the university only
provided that "approximately" twelve Jesuits serve on the university's
board of trustees."' At the time the Opinion Letter was issued, only ten
154. For a brief discussion of "de facto" Catholic institutions see id. at 174.
For a discussion of the idea that status as a public juridic person secures Catholic
identity with greater reliability, see generally Mulvihill, supra note 149.
155. See, e.g., Opinion No. 86-03, 1986 WL 38843, *1 (E.R.I.S.A.); Opinion
No. 86-04A, 1986 WL 38844, *1 (E.R.I.S.A.).
156. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199933053, 1999 WL 634191 (Aug. 20, 1999).
157. See Op. No. 90-12A, 1990 WL 123941, *1 (E.R.I.S.A.); Op. No. 91-14A,
1991 WL 34148, *1 (E.R.I.S.A.).
158. See Op. No. 91-14A, 1991 WL 34148 at *1.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Op. No. 95-10A, 1995 WL 486696, *1, *4 (E.R.I.S.A.); see also Op. No.
90-13A, 1990 WL 123940, *1 (E.R.I.S.A.) (church plan status appropriate for plan
sponsored by a college operated by a religious order that was separately
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of the twenty-seven members of the board were also members of the
162
Society of Jesus. In both cases, the DOL found sufficient control to
permit the employees of the corporation to be deemed to be employees of
the church. 163
The canonical status of the incorporated apostolate of a religious order
may be of evidentiary value in supporting the argument that sufficient
control or association is present to establish that the corporation's lay
employees should be regarded as employees of the church under Section
3(33) of ERISA. As the apostolic work of a public juridic person, "those
who administer the affairs of the public juridic person [i.e., the order] are,
canonically ultimately responsible for the affairs of the ... institution, and
the assets and liabilities of the institution are, canonically, assets and
liabilities of the sponsoring public juridic person."'164  While canonical
responsibility does not necessarily translate into civil responsibility, the
close alliance between the order and its incorporated apostolate which is
dictated by canon law does suggest that the order has a canonical
obligation to control the affairs of the corporation, in addition to any civil
obligation dictated by its civil articles of incorporation or by-laws.
While ERISA and the Code may rightly be viewed as being generous in
their description of "church employees," the scope of this generosity is
not without limitations. The requirement that a plan be maintained for
the benefit of the employees of the church or association of churches is
significant not only for the broad definition of employees, but also for the
restrictions implicit in that term. This is not simply a restatement of the
language emphasizing that the plan must be maintained for the benefit of
the employees, which can be found in both Sections 3(1) and 3(2).
Instead, the statute specifies even further the closeness of the relationship
between the church and the beneficiaries for whom the plan is operated.
In order to qualify for church plan status, "substantially all" of the plan's
membership must be composed of its own employees, the ordained
ministers of the church, the employees of church-controlled tax-exempt
incorporated as a nonprofit membership corporation, whose members were
elected by the order and whose bylaws required that members of the order fill at
least one-third plus one of the total number of seats on the board of directors).
162. See Op. No. 95-10A, 1995 WL 456696 at *1. The Department of Labor
also noted that the bylaws mandated a Jesuit presence on the board, provided that
the board consults the order in the selection of the university president and
expressed a preference that the university president be a Jesuit.
163. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199933053, 1999 WL 634191 (Aug. 20, 1999).
164. See NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW, supra note 131, at
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organizations or former employees. Moreover, Section 3(33)(B)
specifically provides that a church plan does not include a plan "which is
established and maintained primarily for the benefit of employees.., who
are employed in connection with one or more unrelated trades or
businesses." Thus, it would be fair to say that church plan status is only
available to a plan that not only shares a close bond with the church itself,
but that also benefits employees who share a similarly close bond.
Once again, a glance at the Catholic contribution to the modern health
care economy easily shows that this is not simply a semantic issue. The
modern integrated delivery system is equally identifiable in Catholic and
165secular health care structures. Within a modern hospital system, one
might find a hospital, a primary care clinic, a nursing home, a gift shop, a
parking garage, and a pharmacy.166 While the hospital, the clinic and the
nursing home may fall within the scope of the businesses related to the
hospital's tax-exempt purposes, the activities of other components of the
system may not. 67 Section 3(33)(B)(i) of ERISA indicates that a plan that
is established and maintained primarily for the benefit of employees of
such unrelated businesses may not qualify for church plan status. Thus,
while the canonical status of the civil corporation is helpful for
establishing whether the relationship between the employer and the
church is close enough to satisfy Congress' requirements, we also have to
look at the demographics of the plan in order to insure that the
composition of the plan membership meets the expectations of the
statute. In other words, while the gift shop operated by a hospital that is
fulfilling the apostolate of a religious order may be sufficiently close in its
relationship to the order to be "associated" with it for purposes of Section
3(33) of ERISA, the order cannot sponsor a plan whose membership is
165. See generally, CATHOLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION, A HANDBOOK FOR
PLANNING AND DEVELOPING INTEGRATED DELIVERY (1993); Carl H. Hitchner et
al., Integrated Delivery Systems: a Survey of Organizational Models, 29 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 273 (1994).
166. See, e.g., Carle Foundation v. U.S., 611 F.2d 1192, 1198-1200 (7th Cir.
1979) (reviewing revenue rulings related to hospital systems that include gift
shops, parking garages, and other services); see also Hitchner et al., supra note
165, at 274 ("An integrated delivery system normally provides, at a minimum,
hospital, physician, and ancillary health services.").
167. See, e.g., Carle Found., 611 F.2d at 1198 (sales by tax-exempt clinic
pharmacy to non-exempt clinic constitute an unrelated trade or business within
the meaning of 26 U.S.C. §§ 511-513). For a discussion of the application of tax-
exemption standards to integrated delivery systems, see, e.g., Geisinger Health
Plan v. C.I.R., 30 F.3d 494 (3rd Cir. 1994).
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predominantly composed of gift shop employees and expect that the IRS
will view that plan as a "church plan." To put it more simply, church
plans must be both closely associated with a church-affiliated institution
and operated primarily for the benefit of employees whose jobs are
closely associated with the purposes of the institution.
The IRS has created a rather mechanical test to determine whether a
plan is established and maintained in an appropriate manner. The
establishment/maintenance test first examines plan membership at its
inception and then monitors the plan's population over time.68  In
general, plans that were established following the enactment of ERISA,
must first satisfy the requirement of being "established and maintained
primarily for the benefit of employees (or their beneficiaries) that are not
employed in connection with one or more unrelated trades or business.'
169
The "establishment" requirement is met if fewer than half of the
employees who are eligible to participate in the plan on the date of its
establishment are in fact employed in unrelated trades or businesses.
This preliminary inquiry must be supplemented by a more complex,
ongoing examination of the plan's ability to be maintained for the benefit
of those employees on an on-going basis.'7 ' A plan is satisfactorily
maintained as a church plan if fewer than half of plan participants are
employees of unrelated trades or businesses for four of the five
immediately prior plan years. Plans that calculate benefits or
contributions in relation to an employee's compensation must also be able
to demonstrate that during the same plan years less than half of the total
compensation paid by the employer to employees who participate in the
plan was attributable to the compensation paid to employees of unrelated
trades or businesses. M Plans that fail these tests by a small margin or by
virtue of "a reasonable mistake as to what constituted an unrelated trade
or business" are afforded an exemption based on facts and
circumstances. 174
2. Holding the Keys: Who is the Plan Administrator?
A final important issue for plans designed to be eligible for church plan
status is the identity of the plan administrator. Section 3(33)(C)(i) of
168. 26 C.F.R. § 1.414(e)-l(b)(1) (2000).
169. Id.
170. See § 1. 414(e)-1(b)(2)(i)(A).
171. See § 1. 414(e)-1(b)(2)(ii).
172. See § 1. 414(e)-1(b)(2)(B)(ii)(A).
173. See § 1.414(e)-1(b)(2)(B)(ii)(B).
174. § 1.414(e)-1(b)(2)(iii).
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ERISA provides:
A plan established and maintained for its employees (or their
beneficiaries) by a church or by a convention or association of
churches includes a plan maintained by an organization,
whether a civil law corporation or otherwise, the principal
purpose or function of which is the administration or funding of
a plan or program for the provision of retirement benefits or
welfare benefits, or both, for the employees of a church or a
convention or association of churches, if such organization is
controlled by or associated with a church or a convention or
association of churches.
175
In other words, not only is it important to be able to establish that the
plan is maintained for the benefit of employees of corporations that are
controlled by or associated with a church, but it is also important that the
plan administrator enjoy the same relationship with the church. For
example, the Sisters of St. Joseph operated a defined benefit plan for the
benefit of lay employees of their convent. 17  The Official Catholic
Directory specifically included both the order and its convent, thus
evidencing the order's association with the Roman Catholic Church.
17
1
The order appointed the Board of Directors of the convent, who in turn
appointed the members of the plan's administrative committee.17 1 In
addition, only members of the order were eligible to serve on the
171administrative committee. In this instance, the DOL determined that
the composition of the administrative committee insured that its
relationship with the order was sufficiently close to satisfy the
requirements of Section 3(33) of ERISA.
80
In Op. No. 91-11A, the DOL found that a religious order that was the
sole corporate member of the parent corporation of a general hospital
and nursing home was in control of the hospital's benefit plan committee
by virtue of the order's participation in the selection and supervision of
175. ERISA, § 3(33)(C)(i) (1999), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(c)(i) (2000).




180. Id. at *2. See also Op. No. 86, 1986 WL 38843 (E.R.I.S.A.) (sufficient
control found where administrative committee of pension plan established for
benefit of school employees consisted of four members of religious order who
serve at the direction of the Board of Directors of the school that is also subject to
the control of the religious order); Op. No. 81-14A, 1981 WL 17735 (E.R.I.S.A.).
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the administrative committee. Similar precepts guide the IRS's
analysis."' In the case of a plan that is administered by a third-party
administrator, this requirement has been interpreted to mean that the
third-party administrator must be controlled by the church."' While this
analysis may seem to place form over function in some respects, it is clear
that in some instances churches have not asserted sufficient control to
satisfy the statutory requirements.'4
3. What are the results of classification as a church plan?
Section 4(b)(2) of ERISA provides that the provisions of Title I of
ERISA shall not apply to a church plan that has not made an election
181under Section 410(d) of the Code. Similar provisions exempt a non-
16
electing church plan from ERISA-related amendments to the Code.
Once eligibility for church plan status has been established, the plan
administrator has the authority, under civil law, to determine whether to
elect to participate in ERISA and the related requirements of the Code.
Section 410(d) of the Code and the corresponding regulations set forth
the basic method and the consequences of a church plan election. While
the statute speaks of the "church" as making the election, the associated
treasury regulations clearly state that "[t]he election provided by this
section may be made only by the plan administrator of the church plan.''
88
181. See Op. No. 91-11A, 1991 WL 34145 at *3 (E.R.I.S.A.).
182. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199931053, 1999 PRL LEXIS 724 (1999).
183. See Friend v. ANCILLIA Sys. Inc., No. 99-C3895, 1999 WL 76789 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 21, 1999).
184. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-38-057, General Counsel Mem. 39832 (Oct. 12,
1990).
185. ERISA, 4(b)(2) (1999), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(2) (2000).
186. See 26 U.S.C. § 410(d) (2000).
187. The Internal Revenue Code provides:
(d) Election by church to have participation, vesting, funding, etc.,
provisions apply.
(1) In general.- If the church or convention or association of churches
which maintains any church plan makes an election under this subsection
(in such form and manner as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe),
then the provisions of this title relating to participation, vesting, funding,
etc. (as in effect from time to time) shall apply to such church plan as if
such provisions did not contain an exclusion for church plans.
26 U.S.C. § 410(d)(1) (2000). Moreover, once made, the election is irrevocable
with respect to that plan. See also id. § 410(d)(2) (2000).
188. See Treas. Reg. 26 C.F.R. § 11.410-1(c)(3) (2000). An election may,
however, be conditional upon the receipt of a favorable determination letter. See
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Thus, by designating the plan administrator as the sole entity authorized
to make such a decision, the regulations insure that an election may not
be forced upon a church or inferred from its conduct. 89 This is of
particular importance in considering the rights of a plan participant whose
own interests may dictate that a plan either is subject to ERISA or
exempt from it. It is the plan administrator and not the plan participant
who may elect for the plan to be covered under ERISA.
For example, in Tucker v. Ochsner Health Plan,'9° a Baptist minister
voluntarily terminated his participation in a church-sponsored health
plan. Unfortunately, shortly after he terminated his participation in the
plan, the minister fell out of a tree and injured himself."9" In attempting to
establish the plan's obligation to provide coverage for his quite substantial
injuries, he argued that even though the plan met the definition of a
church plan, it had waived its exemption from ERISA because the group
health services agreement documenting the plan's administration
apparently incorporated the requirements of COBRA, codified at Section
609 of ERISA.19 Since there was no evidence that the plan administrator
had specifically elected to be subject to ERISA, the Louisiana Court of
Appeals held that the language of the group services agreement could not
be considered to be a waiver of the church plan's ERISA exemption. 93
It is interesting to note that while Section 414(e) of the Code and the
related treasury regulations primarily address the concerns of pension
plans, the DOL and the courts have clearly recognized that the concept of
a church plan may just as easily be applied to a welfare benefit plan. In
Opinion Letter 90-12A, for example, the DOL listed life insurance and
health insurance arrangements as church plans. 94 Moreover, the plan
under which the minister sought benefits in Tucker v. Ochsner Health
also Treas. Reg. 26 C.F.R. § 11.410-1(c)(4) (2000).
189. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Services, Inc., 979 F.
Supp. 781 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (considering a determination letter issued by the
Internal Revenue Service to be "specific" evidence of lack of a federal court's
jurisdiction over a church plan under ERISA).
190. Tucker v. Ochsner Health Plan, 720 So. 2d 839 (La. App. 1998).
191. See id.
192. See id. at 841.
193. See id.
194. See Op. No. 90-12A (Dep't Labor May 1990); see also Op. No. 90-13A
(Dep't Labor May 1990) (stating that retirement plans and health plans are church
plans); Op. No. 95-10A (Dep't Labor June 1995); Gen. Counsel Mem. 39793 (June
16, 1995).
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Plan provided health insurance benefits and therefore, had ERISA
coverage been elected, it would clearly have been classified as a welfare
benefit plan."5
There is a range of regulations to which non-electing pension and
welfare plans sponsored by churches and church affiliates remain
subject. 196 However, the consequences of electing ERISA coverage are, in
some respects, quite different for pension plans and welfare plans. The
following sections briefly discuss the specific application of this election to
pension plans before discussing the points of commonality between
pension and welfare benefit plans.
a. Pension Plans
While ERISA has been subjected to many criticisms since it was signed
into law on September 2, 1974,19 one should not forget that ERISA was
the instrument by which workers claimed a right to early vesting of their
benefits and to the enforcement of an employer's promises of pensionb . 198
benefits. A decision to subject a church plan to ERISA regulation is a
decision to allow a participant in a church plan to share the assumptions
that the employee of a secular corporation may now make regarding the
security of his or her benefits. A plan administrator electing to treat his or
her company's pension plan as an ERISA plan has extended to the plan,
among other requirements, the following obligations under the Code and
the related provisions of ERISA: (1) minimum participation standards
under Section 410; (2) vesting standards under Section 411; (3) minimum
funding standards under Section 412; (4) limitations on prohibited
transactions under Section 4975; and (5) the obligations to provide joint
and survivor annuities, where applicable, under Section 401(a)(11).'9 9 In
195. Tucker, 720 So. 2d at 840.
196. Significant among these is the reporting requirements set forth in 26
U.S.C. § 6039 (2000).
197. See, e.g., Suggs v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 847 F. Supp. 1324, 1355 (S.D.
Miss. 1994) ("When an analysis is made of present controlling case law under
ERISA in the field of health insurance, it seems that when most major provisions
or terms have had to be interpreted, an interpretation has prevailed that provided
less protection to 'employees and their beneficiaries,' than they had before
ERISA was adopted.").
198. See generally David L. Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of
State Law: A Study in Effective Federalism, 48 U. PiTr. L. REV. 427, 443-48 (1987)
(describing pension reform efforts leading up to enactment of ERISA).
199. See 26 C.F.R. § 11.410-1(a) (2000). Additional requirements include: 26
U.S.C. §§ 401(a)(12) (mergers); 401(a)(13) (assignment or alienation of benefits);
401(a)(14) (time of benefit commencement); 401(a)(15) (social security) and
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addition, the pension plan also becomes subject to the disclosure and
fiduciary obligations of ERISA, together with its enforcement provisions.
The difference between a pension plan that elects to be subject to
ERISA and a non-electing church plan amounts to a decision between
being a part of the modern pension regulatory system or remaining part of
the pre-ERISA world that existed before 1974. To put it plainly, a
non-electing church plan need not comply with ERISA's major advances
in the protection of employee rights. To name only three of ERISA's
many requirements, it need not offer vesting within the five year period
currently obligated by Section 410(a); it need not comply with minimum
funding requirements; and it need not subscribe for plan termination
insurance.20 0
A non-electing church pension plan is not exempt from compliance
with a wide variety of Code requirements. The difference, however, is
that the scope of the obligations defined by those requirements is
determined by reference to law dating prior to the enactment of ERISA.
However, non-electing plans do remain subject to a wide variety of pre-
ERISA regulations that remain extant under the Code in order to
preserve their tax-qualified status. While tax-exempt organizations such
as churches do not reap as many benefits from tax qualification as private
entities that may take advantage of the accelerated deductibility of plan
contributions, tax-qualified status nonetheless offers a substantial benefit
to the employee who can defer taxation of his or her retirement savingsuntil " " " 201
until distribution. In particular, a non-electing church plan continues to
be subject to the requirement that benefits be provided pursuant to a
written instrument. 202 Moreover, the plan must provide a definitely
determinable benefit.20 ' A variety of nondiscrimination requirements
remain in effect for non-electing church plans, including, among others,
Sections 415, 416, 401(a)(26) and 401(m).2 4 In addition, several pre-
401(a)(19) (2000) (withdrawals of employee contributions).
200. See generally Gen. Couns. Mem. 39007 (Nov. 2, 1982) (citing Harclerode
v. Sisters of Mercy, No. 79-4022 (D. Kan. Nov 2. 1981) (summary judgment
awarded to defendant hospital after it demonstrated that its pension plan was a
church plan and therefore not subject to ERISA's vesting requirements).
201. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 402(a) (deferral of taxation for participants in tax-
qualified trust); cf. Id. § 402(b) (principles of Section 83 apply to taxation of
contributions to nonqualified trusts).
202. See id. § 401(a)(2).
203. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (2000).
204. See generally I.R.S. Notice 98-39, 1998-33 I.R.B. 11 (Aug. 17, 1998)
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ERISA requirements apply to non-electing church plans, the most
significant of which are the pre-ERISA vesting requirements set forth in
pre-ERISA 401(a)(4) and 401(a)(7), which required vesting at normal
retirement age, and the pre-ERISA funding requirements of Section
401(a)(7) 0 5
It is imperative that one understands that ERISA prescribes minimum
levels of protection for employees who participate in pension plans.
Moreover, exemption from ERISA does not mean that the sponsor of a
church plan may not contractually bind itself to compliance with these
minimum protections or other similar obligations. In the most blunt
terms, one might simply say that in retaining exemption from ERISA, the
church plan sponsor has also retained the right to define, in large part, the
extent to which his or her plan will offer protected benefits to his or her
employees. It is the sponsor of a non-electing church plan, and not the
government, which decides the extent to which those benefits are
protected.
b. Welfare Plans
The difference between church welfare plans that become subject to
ERISA and non-electing church welfare plans is not quite as stark.
Welfare plans have never been subject to as significant an amount of
legislation as have pension plans. ERISA itself provides very few
mandates to which a welfare plan is subject."6 However, like a pension
plan, a church welfare plan may be operated in a certain manner in order
to procure tax-related benefits for its employees and to avoid financial
penalties to its sponsor. A church welfare plan that is designed to receive
special tax treatment under Sections 105 and 106 of the Code, among
others, and must comply with those provisions regardless of whether they
(noting that the Small Business Job Protection Act provided that the Secretary of
the Treasury was to design nondiscrimination and coverage safe harbors for
church plans and providing that non-electing church plans may exercise
reasonable good faith interpretation of Sections 401(a)(4), 401(a)(5), 401(1) and
414(s) until plan years beginning on or after Jan. 1, 2001).
205. See generally Karen B. Kotner & Leslye G. Laderman, Defined Benefit
Plans of Churches and State and Local Governments, 372 TAX MGM'T PORTFOLIOS
(BNA) A-13 (1990).
206. See Curtiss-Wright v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995) ("Nor does
ERISA establish any minimum participation, vesting, or funding requirements for
welfare plans as it does for pension plans."); see generally Colleen E. Medill,
HIPAA And Its Related Legislation: a New Role For Erisa in The Regulation of
Private Health Care Plans?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 485, 494-507 (1998) (analyzing
federal regulation to which ERISA health plans are subject).
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are subject to ERISA.207 In addition, some special consideration must be
given to the relevance of COBRA requirements for church-sponsored
group health insurance plans. The DOL has noted that a church plan,
which is not subject to ERISA, is not required to comply with the
provisions of ERISA that pertain to COBRA. In Op. No. 95-10, the
Jesuits received an acknowledgment that the benefit plans of St. Joseph
University, including a variety of welfare benefit plans, were church plans
exempt from ERISA. The DOL specifically noted, however that its
decision did not extend to any tax issues, and that COBRA, a
requirement that appears both in the Code and in ERISA, was
administered by the IRS.
c. The Common Problem: ERISA Preemption
One of the most controversial aspects of ERISA is its forceful
208preemption clause. Section 514(a) of ERISA provides that ERISA
preempts state laws that relate to employee benefit plans. 0 9 Although
this language is subject to several significant exceptions set forth in
Section 514(b), 21 it remains a very broad statement of Congress' intent to
subject ERISA plans to federal, rather than state, regulation. During the
early years of ERISA jurisprudence, the self-consciously broad
construction of this language laid the groundwork for an interpretation of
ERISA preemption as "sweeping. 2 1 1  The term "relates to" was the
instrument by which courts felled almost any state law that "ha[d] a
207. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 105,106, 117(d), 120, 125, 127, 129, 132 (2000).
208. Legal scholars have developed an extensive literature on ERISA
preemption. See, e.g., David L. Gregory, ERISA Law in the Rehnquist Court, 42
SYRACUSE L. REV. 945 (1991); Karen Jordan, Coverage Denials in ERISA Plans:
Assessing the Federal Legislative Solution, 65 Mo. L. REV. 405 (2000); Karen
Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual and Interpretive Issues, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1149 (1998); Karen Jordan, The Complete Preemption Dilemma: A
Legal Process Perspective, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 927 (1996); Karen Jordan,
Travelers Insurance: New Support for the Argument to Restrain ERISA
Preemption, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 255 (1996).
209. See ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
210. See ERISA § 514(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b).
211. See, e.g., Rivers v. Central and Southwest Corp., 186 F. 3d 681, 683 (5th
Cir. 1999); Turner v. Fallon Cmty. Health Plan, 953 F. Supp. 419, 424 (D. Ma.
1997), affd, 127 F.3d 196 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1072 (1998); see also
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 98-99 (1983) (describing the legislative
history of ERISA and concluding that Congress intended Section 514 to be
interpreted broadly); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990).
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connection with or reference to" an employee benefit plan." ' Thus, state
law claims based on breach of contract, state-mandated benefits, and a
variety of other legislative initiatives or interpretations of common law
were laid waste by ERISA's determined focus on the right of the federal
213
government to regulate employee benefit plans.
Although the force of ERISA preemption applies to both pension
plans and welfare plans, the impact of ERISA preemption is greater with
214
respect to welfare plans. While ERISA preempts state law attempts to
regulate pension plans, it also provides pension plan participants with
some level of protection by specifying a variety of rules concerning the
calculation and distribution of benefits, as well as certain limitations on
funding and vesting of benefits.21 1 Moreover, tax-qualified pension plans
must also adhere to a vast number of specific regulations under the Code,
many of which are concerned with securing the employer's promise of
employee benefits and insuring that tax advantages are not immoderately
211biased towards the highly compensated employees. In contrast, ERISA
says very little about the regulation of the content or form of distribution
of benefits under welfare plans. Beyond mandatory compliance with the
essential requirements of disclosure, fiduciary responsibility and
enforcement procedures, welfare plans may be operated with little regard
117to any content mandated by ERISA . Moreover, the influence of other
federal legislation is also insubstantial in comparison to the specific
requirements imposed upon pension plans. Since Metropolitan Life v.
Massachusetts'218 sensational observation that Section 514(b)(2)(A) saved
state-based insurance laws from ERISA preemption only with regard to
insured plans, there has been widespread acknowledgment that a
self-funded employee welfare benefit plan operates in what is often called
"the ERISA vacuum."' 219 In other words, a self-funded employee welfare
212. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 96 (1983).
213. See Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992);
Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298 (11th Cir.
1993); Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1997).
214. See generally Curtiss-Wright v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995).
215. See supra text accompanying note 199.
216. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 410(b) (2000).
217. See Curtiss-Wright, 514 U.S. at 78.
218. 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985).
219. See generally, Kathy Cerminara, Protecting Participants in and
Beneficiaries of ERISA-Governed Managed Health Care Plans, 29 U. MEM. L.
REV. 317, 327-341 (discussing ERISA vacuum); Mary Ann Bobinski, Unhealthy
Federalism: Barriers to Increasing Health Care Access for the Uninsured, 24 U.C.
DAvIs L. REV. 255 (1990).
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benefit plan may count on the preemption of state laws relating to that
plan (including laws regulating health insurance). That same plan is
unlikely to find many limitations with respect its design and structure in
federal law beyond ERISA's general directives regarding the provision of
continuation benefits and parity for mental health benefits. Moreover,
because ERISA provides no vesting requirement for welfare benefits, a
participant in an employer-sponsored health insurance plan is likely to
find that his or her employer possesses the right to amend or terminate his
or her plan without constraint.220
The application of ERISA preemption to claims based on an
employer's promises of health insurance benefits has drawn significant
attention in the past decade. Among the most dire cases to examine the
effect of ERISA preemption on claims based on health insurance benefits
within a managed care system stand Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc. ,
Kuhl v. Lincoln National Health Plan,2 2 and Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers
Insurance Co.2 2 3 In each of these cases, the plaintiff alleged a significant
loss that was directly traceable to the design of his or her employee
benefit plan and yet uncompensable under state law due to ERISA
preemption. In Corcoran, a pregnant woman was denied hospitalization
and lost her baby during a period when her home health nurse was
unavailable.224 In Kuhl, a heart patient who was required to utilize a
particular hospital for a transplant operation passed away before the
facilities became available for his transplant. 22  In Andrews-Clarke,
limitations on the benefits available to a depressed alcoholic patient
221
seemed to be directly connected to his subsequent suicide. In each of
these cases, the patient or his heirs pressed a suit based on state law,
227
which was ultimately preempted. Moreover, in each case, the courts
found that no additional damages were available under ERISA beyond
228
the payment for the care that had actually been rendered. Although, in
220. See Curtiss-Wright, 514 U.S. at 73, 75.
221. Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
222. Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc., 999 F.2d 298
(11th Cir. 1993).
223. Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1997).
224. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1321.
225. Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 299.
226. Andrews-Clarke, 984 F. Supp. at 52.
227. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1331; Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 302; Andrews-Clarke,
984 F. Supp. at 53.
228. See Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1338; Kuhl, 999 F.2d at 304; Andrews-Clarke,
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recent years, courts have attempted to place limitations on the impact of
ERISA preemption, the fact remains that as long as Section 514 is in
operation, many plaintiffs will find that their claims under state law-
legitimate or otherwise-will be preempted and that ERISA's deliberately
limited range of damages will not recompense them to a similar extent.
When we ask what is at stake for an employee when his or her
employer decides whether to maintain a church plan within or outside
ERISA, we must look both at the choice regarding the content of the plan
and the enforcement of its promises. In some ways, the differences in the
content of the plan may be less significant. If an employer were to
examine the effect of the church plan exemption on the well-being of
employees who participate in a pension plan, 2 9 for instance, he would
have to weigh the 'employees' interest in subjecting the plan to federal
vesting and funding requirements against the costs that the employer
would incur in funding a benefit that vests after five years. It is important
to remember, however, that nothing prevents an employer from
contractually binding himself to similar constraints in a non-electing
church plan. Likewise, a non-electing church plan that provides health
insurance benefits would differ in the obligations concerning the content
of its plan under federal law only with respect to the continuation
coverage required by COBRA (required of ERISA plans) and the mental
health parity provisions (also set forth in ERISA).
However, in the area of claims enforcement, the election concerning
whether a plan should be subject to ERISA raises much larger concerns.
Simply put, a plan that is subject to ERISA is a plan that is protected, to a
very large degree, from claims based on state law. A plan that is not
subject to ERISA cannot claim the same protection. In other words, a
non-electing church plan may not be subject to the requirements of
ERISA but is subject to the requirements of state law. Thus, the result of
cases such as Corcoran, Kuhl and Andrews might be quite different if the
defendants were deprived of the opportunity to argue that ERISA
preempted state law claims based on common law theories of breach of
contract, misrepresentation or other similar claims.
The decision to preserve a plan's exemption from ERISA is not,
however, a simple, high-minded decision to avoid the consequences, of
ERISA preemption with respect to the enforcement of participants'
984 F. Supp. at 53.
229. The church plan election is primarily a design decision and, as such, is
not subject to fiduciary requirements. See generally Bryant v. Food Lion, Inc., 774
F. Supp. 1484, 1491-92 (explaining the difference between design decisions and
fiduciary decisions).
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claims. Until very recently, two practical problems befuddled the
administrators of church plans that claimed exemption from ERISA and
thus subjected themselves to state law. Stripped of ERISA's protections
for self-insured plans, church plan sponsors that elected exemption from
ERISA faced the possible enforcement of a confusing array of state
insurance laws.' 30 The decision to remain exempt from ERISA and thus
bereft of ERISA preemption resulted in the potential application of many
state insurance laws to church plans, including compliance with licensure
laws as well as basic state insurance provisions regarding protection
against insolvency. 31 A secondary consequence of this "entangled" state
of affairs was the reported reluctance of service providers to do business
with church plans under these ambiguous circumstances. The Church
Plan Parity and Entanglement Prevention Act of 1999, which was signed
into law in July 2000, offers a very limited haven to sponsors and
administrators of church plans. Under the new legislation, church plans
are deemed to be in compliance with state insurance laws regarding
licensure and insolvency. 233 Administrators of non-electing church welfare
plans need no longer fear that state insurance laws will require the
financial securities that are expected of true insurance companies.24 On
the other hand, the assistance offered by this legislation is very limited.
230. See generally, S. 1309, Church Plan Parity and Entanglement Prevention
Act, Statement of Hon. Boehner (June 26, 2000) available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-binin/query/D?rl06:2:./temp/-rlO6HbevHA:: (last visited
Sept. 22, 2000) (stating that due to the church plan exemption, "these church
programs are potentially subject to regulation by individual States, which was
never intended when church plans were designed.").
231. See Church Plan Parity and Entanglement Prevention Act, P.L. No. 106-
244, §-1 (stating that the purpose of the Act is to clarify the status of church plans
with respect to "State insurance laws that require or solely relate to licensing,
solvency, insolvency, or the status of such plan as a single employer plan.").
232. S. 1309, Church Plan Parity and Entanglement Prevention Act, Statement
of Hon. John R. Thune in the House of Representatives (June 26, 2000) available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?rl06:2:./temp/-rlO6HbevHA:: (visited Sept.
22, 2000) (stating that "[miany service providers have been reluctant to do
business with church benefit programs for fear that they themselves may violate
state insurance rules barring contracts with unlicensed entities.").
233. See Church Plan Parity and Entanglement Prevention Act, supra note
231, § 2(d) (stating that for the purposes of enforcing provisions of state insurance
laws relating to licensure or solvency, "the church plan shall be subject to State
enforcement as if the church plan were an insurer licensed by the State.").
234. Id.
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All other state insurance laws remain in effect with respect to insured
plans and there is no preemption of state laws other than those described
in the legislation as relating to these limited financial matters.
The basic choice that faces the sponsor of a church plan remains the
same: should the plan be subject to ERISA, with all of its potential for
protecting the plan and related parties from claims based on state law, or
should it remain outside ERISA's safety zone?
The remainder of this article analyzes this choice in light of the
Catholic Church's precept that an employer must pay an employee a just
wage. To put it differently, does the Catholic notion of a just wage weigh
for or against a decision to subject a plan to ERISA?
II. CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHINGS AND THE TRADITION OF A JUST
WAGE
It was Leo XIII who brought the weight of the papacy to bear on the
notion of a just wage in his 1891 encyclical, RERUM NOVARUM. 35
Before we examine RERUM NOVARUM and the "new things" it brought to
the Roman Catholic hierarchy's analysis of justice in the workplace, it is
perhaps fitting to recall that Leo XIII also advised Catholic scholars to
return to the methodology and the substance of the writings of Saint
Thomas Aquinas."'
235. See LEO XIII, RERUM NOVARUM: THE CONDITION OF LABOR in
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT - THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE 13 (David J.
O'Brien & Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992). Thomas Bokenkotter has described
RERUM NOVARUM as "the Magna Carta of social Catholicism, the movement that
more than any other within the Church gradually forced Catholics out of their
medievalism and state of siege mentality and inspired them to grapple realistically
with the problems of the twentieth century." See also THOMAS BOKENKOTTER, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 311-12 (1977); Richard T.
DeGeorge, Neither the Hammer and Sickle Nor the Eye of the Needle: One
Hundred Years of Catholic Social Thought on Economic Systems in CATHOLIC
SOCIAL THOUGHT AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER - BUILDING ON ONE HUNDRED
YEARS, supra note 8, at 127 (stating that Catholic social teaching cannot be
understood without comprehending Marxism).
236. Leo XIII, AETERNI PATRIS (1879) available at
http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/leoxii/en... /hfl-xiiienc_04081879_aeterni-
patris-en.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2000): see also JOHN PAUL II, VERITATIS
SPLENDOR, supra note 80, 44 ("The Church has often made reference to the
Thomistic doctrine of natural law."); see generally Oliver F. Williams, Catholic
Social Teaching: A Communitarian Democratic Capitalism for the New World
Order in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER - BUILDING
ON ONE HUNDRED YEARS, supra note 8, at 5, 17 (describing "the formation of
[Vol. 17:1
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The vision of the common good as the normative end to which human
endeavor should strive is the distinctive marking of the articulated social
teachings of the Catholic Church. Leo's appeal to Aquinas suggests that
the origins of modern Catholic social teaching hearken both to a
traditional conception of justice as the pursuit of the common good237 and
to the idea that human beings exercise certain "natural" rights which
derive from God and not from human legislation.2 3 ' Aquinas defined law
as "nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good, made
by him who has care of the community, and promulgated., 23 9  For
Aquinas, God's "conception of things is not subject to time, but is
eternal.... therefore it is that this kind of law must be called eternal.
24
0
His conception of the natural law posited the human being's "partak[ing]
of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for
others."241 Aquinas explained:
Wherefore [the rational creature] has a share of the Eternal
Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act
and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the rational
creature is called the natural law. Hence the Psalmist...
impl[ied] that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern
what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the
natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine
light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else
virtuous persons" as the "heart of the teaching of Thomas Aquinas" which
"continues to form the basis of church documents"); J. Bryan Hehir, The Social
Role of the Church: Leo XIII, Vatican II and John Paul II in CATHOLIC SOCIAL
THOUGHT AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER - BUILDING ON ONE HUNDRED YEARS,
supra note 8, at 29, 49; Michael Novak, Liberty and Social Justice: Rescuing a
Virtue in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER - BUILDING
ON ONE HUNDRED YEARS, supra note 8, at 269, 270-71; Russell Hittinger,
Introduction in HEINRICH A. ROMMEN, THE NATURAL LAW XX-xxiii (Thomas R.
Hanley trans. 1998) (discussing impact of AETERNI PATRIS in promoting influence
of Aquinas on development of twentieth-century thought on natural law).
237. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE TREATISE ON LAW 320 (R.J. Henle ed. and trans.
1993).
238. See ROMMEN, supra note 236, at 4 ("The idea of a natural law can
emerge only when men come to perceive that not all law is unalterable and
unchanging divine law.").
239. See Aquinas, supra note 237, at 145.
240. Id. at 154.
241. Id. at 159.
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242than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law.
In reflecting upon the role of human law (as opposed to natural law),
Aquinas believed that since "the end of law is the common good ....
human laws should be proportionate to the common good." 3  Thus,
human laws should be directed to the welfare of the community of the
state, which is "composed of many persons., 244 However, a human law
which does not always further the welfare of the community-in other
words, that is in conflict with the natural law-may in certain limited
circumstances be disregarded or changed. Aquinas' vision of life in
society focused on the human being's inherent understanding of the
obligation to strive toward an ideal of "bliss or happiness ' 245 and his
pragmatic view that this endeavor must take place in a social context.
Leo's appeal to the writings of Aquinas should remind us that even
when the rhetoric of RERUM NOVARUM faintly echoes the Marxist
critique which permeated the European secular left of its time, 24' Leo
wrote from a different, decidedly non-Marxist perspective. Rooted in
Thomist philosophy and the conception of a natural law, RERUM
NOVARUM rejects neither private property nor the disparity between rich
248and poor. Instead, RERUM NOVARUM accepts these elements: the first
242. Id. at 159-60.
243. Id. at 311.
244. Id.
245. See Aquinas, supra note 189, at 6.
246. See, e.g., RERUM NOVARUM, supra note 235, T 32 ("On the one side
there is the party which holds the power because it holds the wealth .... On the
other side there is the needy and powerless multitude, sore and suffering, always
ready for disturbance."); see generally David L. Gregory, Catholic Labor Theory
and the Transformation of Work, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 119, 119 (1988)
("Catholic social teaching on labor incorporates and differs from both Marxist and
capitalist teachings.").
247. See generally JOHN PAUL II, SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS [ 41
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/j ohn-paY30121987_sollicitudo-rei-
socialis-en.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2000) ("The Church's doctrine is not a 'third
way' between liberal capitalism and Marxist collectivism."); Richard T.
DeGeorge, supra note 235, at 127-41 (stating that Catholic social teaching cannot
be understood without comprehending Marxism); THOMAS BOKENKOTrER,
CHURCH AND REVOLUTION - CATHOLICS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1998).
248. See, e.g., RERUM NOVARUM, in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT AND THE
NEW WORLD ORDER - BUILDING ON ONE HUNDRED YEARS, supra note 235, at 28-
29 ("[N]either justice nor the common good allows anyone to seize that which
belongs to another, or, under the pretext of futile and ridiculous equality, to lay
hands on other people's fortunes.").
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is a right that is necessary for a person's dignity and the second is an
assessment of how society is organized. Nonetheless, RERUM NOVARUM
directly raises the question of a just wage in a less than ideal society. 249 It
is not difficult to note the difference between a purely capitalist
conception of an appropriate wage-the point of efficient functioning in
the marketplace-and Marx's observation that capital was simply
objectified labor.250 Leo's contribution was to state that this was not
simply a question of economics, Marxist or otherwise. Instead, he asserted
not only the right to a just wage but a conception of how that just wage
should be calculated.251
One should pause here and reflect on Leo's words from more than a
century ago:
Let it be granted, then, that, as a rule, workman and employer
should make free agreements, and in particular should freely
agree as to wages; nevertheless there is a dictate of nature more
imperious and more ancient than any bargain between man and
man, that the remuneration must be enough to support the wage
252earner in reasonable and frugal comfort.
More specifically, Leo called for the worker to receive a wage that would
"enable him to maintain himself, his wife, and his children in reasonable
comfort. ,53 This wage should be delivered to the worker regardless of
the fact that it might limit the profits of the employer because the worker
himself had the right to sell his labor in order to acquire private property.
The markings of Aquinas' influence can be seen in Leo's words. First, the
worker and the employer shared what Leo viewed as a "natural" right to
own private property. Second, the common good demanded that the
employer properly compensate his workers in order that they may
exercise that right.
The concept of a just wage has held steady even as church documents
249. Id. at 31.
250. KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 270-80,
993-95 (Vintage Books, Ben Fowkes trans. 1977).
251. See RERUM NOVARUM, in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT AND THE NEW
WORLD ORDER - BUILDING ON ONE HUNDRED YEARS, supra note 235, at 32 ("If a
workman's wages be sufficient to enable him to maintain himself, his wife, and his
children in reasonable comfort, he will not find it difficult, if he is a sensible man,
to study economy.").
252. Id. at 31.
253. Id. at % 32.
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have grown more accepting of capitalism as an organizational structure.5 4
Even when the economy is governed by marketplace values and
calculations based on efficiency in wage negotiations, Catholic social
teachings draw a line beyond which an employer should not venture.
That line is the just wage. Just as many of the twentieth-century
encyclicals on Catholic social teachings have marked anniversaries, like
RERUM NOVARUM (consider, for example, QUADRAGESIMO ANNO,
OCTOGESIMO ANNO and CENTISIMUS ANNO directly marking the fortieth,
eightieth and hundredth anniversaries of the first of the social
encyclicals), so have subsequent church teachings on a "just wage" always
returned to the two basic notions articulated by Leo XIII.
First, the amount of a worker's wage not only requires his consent, but
is also subject to a non-negotiable minimum in order to be considered to
be a just wage. It should be noted, of course, that these precepts do not
operate in a vacuum. Pius XI, who brought the term "social justice" to
Catholic social teachings,255 saw the just wage in the context of the
common good, noting that wages should not destroy the viability of a
business."' John XXIII in particular noted that the common good could
not demand that business affairs be neglected. In MATER ET MAGISTRA,
John XXIII recalled that the "norms of justice and equity" should govern
compensation decisions in order to insure that "workers receive a wage
sufficient to lead a life worthy of man and to fulfill family responsibilities
properly." 257 Yet even MATER ET MAGISTRA was at pains to explain the
parameters of that decision within the employer's economic context.
But in determining what constitutes an appropriate wage, the
following must necessarily be taken into account: first of all, the
contribution of individuals to the economic effort; the economic
state of the enterprises within which they work; the
requirements of each community, especially as regards overall
employment; finally, what concerns the common good of all
peoples, namely, of the various States associated among
254. See, e.g., JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS in CATHOLIC SOCIAL
THOUGHT AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER - BUILDING ON ONE HUNDRED YEARS,
supra note 8, 15.
255. See Pius XI, QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT
AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER - BUILDING ON ONE HUNDRED YEARS, supra note
8,157.
256. Id. at 57.
257. See JOHN XXIII, MATER ET MAGISTRA: CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIAL
PROGRESS in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER -
BUILDING ON ONE HUNDRED YEARS, supra note 8, 136.
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258themselves but differing in character and extent.
Thus, because the opportunity to work is a basic right of all members of
the community,259 the common good requires that the amount of the just
wage not exceed the employer's ability to stay in business. Neither,
however, do the social teachings justify an employer's paying the
minimum amount required by civil law when that amount cannot support
the worker within the boundaries considered acceptable under the social
teachings.
Second, the just wage is defined not solely in relation to the employee's
capacity to work, but also with reference to the amount needed to sustain
the worker and his family in "reasonable and frugal comfort." 260 Thus, the
employer's responsibility to provide a just wage to his employee is also a
responsibility to contribute to the common good by insuring that the
employee can support his family. This notion is reiterated in every major
encyclical pertaining to work from RERUM NOVARUM to CENTESIMUS
ANNUS. 26' The worker is viewed not only as an individual, but also as a
member of a family and a member of a community. Just as RERUM
NOVARUM and, more recently, LABORENS EXERCENS have called for the
respect of a worker's right to exercise his religion and to have time to
pray, so have they assumed and mandated respect for his participation in
the economic well-being of his family. A just wage is a wage that permits
a worker to care for his family.
Because Catholic social teaching has developed over a span of the
century and has not remained a static expression of Leo's assessment of
the world economy in 1891, it has also responded to the development of
the modern economy and the pressures of the modern marketplace. In
recent years, Catholic social teachings have taken account of the
importance that the workplace and the compensation that is earned play
in financing a worker's health insurance and his pension benefits as well.
In LABORENS EXERCENS, John Paul II painted a picture of the just wage
in the modern economy. In describing the relations between worker and
employer, John Paul II noted:
258. Id. at 71.
259. See generally, Gregory, supra note 246, at 130 ("Work is a fundamental
dimension of human existence.").
260. RERUM NOVARUM, supra note 235, 34.
261. See, e.g., id.; see also Quadragesimo Anno, supra note 255, 71; Mater et
Magistra, supra note 257, 71; Centesimus Anno, supra note 254, 8; see generally
Centesimus Anno, supra note 254, T39, 49.
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Besides wages, various social benefits intended to ensure the life
and health of workers and their families play a part here. The
expenses involved in health care, especially in the case of
accidents at work, demand that medical assistance should be
easily available for workers and that as far as possible it should
be cheap or even free of charge.... A third sector concerns the
right to a pension and to insurance for old age and in case of
accidents at work.262
To put it simply, LABORENS EXERCENS seems to say that a just wage
includes access to just benefits.
How can one identify a just benefit? In some societies, of course, social
benefits are provided by the state in the form of national health insurance
or social security. LABORENS EXERCENS is thus sometimes analyzed in
terms of its impact on the discussion regarding the desirability of
government mandates. In the United States, however, the dominant
means of access to health insurance is through access to a job that
provices health insurance benefits. 264 The Catholic employer cannot,
therefore, dismiss LABORENS EXERCENS and its interpretation of a just
wage as pertaining strictly to government-provided benefits. LABORENS
EXERCENS speaks not only to the Catholic voter, but also to the Catholic
worker and the Catholic employer.
Further explanation of the meaning of a just wage may be found in
canon law, which resonates with echoes of Catholic social teaching
regarding a just wage. Canon 1286, '2, which addresses the management
of ecclesiastical goods states, for example, that churches ".... are to pay
employees a just and decent wage so that they may provide appropriately
for their needs and those of their family." Canon 230, '2 explicitly states:
[Lay persons employed by the church] have a right to a decent
remuneration suited to their condition; by such remuneration
they should be able to provide decently for their own needs and
for those of their family with due regard for the prescriptions of
civil law; they likewise have a right that their pension, social
262. JOHN PAUL II, LABOREM EXERCENS: ON HUMAN WORK, in CATHOLIC
SOCIAL THOUGHT AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER - BUILDING ON ONE HUNDRED
YEARS, supra note 8, at 379-80.
263. See, e.g., Michael Warner, From Subsidiarity to Subsidies: America's
Catholic Bishops Reorient Their Teaching on Society and Entitlements, 1966-1986,
11 N.D. J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 581 (1997); Kenneth R. Himes, O.F.M., Rights
of Entitlement. A Roman Catholic Perspective, 11 N.D. J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
507 (1997).
264. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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security and health benefits be duly provided."'
These themes resound again at the level of the National Conference of
Catholic Bishops. The bishops' 1986 pastoral letter, ECONOMIC JUSTICE
FOR ALL, 2 has made an important contribution to the analysis of a just
wage in the American context.' 67 The bishops reiterated the principle of
the common good as an objective to be sought in compensation
relationships within the American economy. The bishops also committed
themselves, as employers, "to the principle that those who serve the
Church .... should receive a sufficient livelihood and the social benefits
provided by responsible employers in our nation."'2 6  Moreover, the
Conference has recently published a working paper that reminds Catholic
health care institutions of the importance of applying Catholic social
teachings, including the requirement of "just compensation," to their
workplaces. 269 The working paper cites ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL in
reminding employers that "[w]ork is also the ordinary way most people
meet their material needs, so wages and benefits need to be adequate to
sustain workers and their families." 270 The "elements of a just and fair
workplace" include "fair wages" and "adequate benefits.
2 71
In some ways, the structure of the American civil law governing
employee benefits puts in the employer's hands the responsibility to
determine the "adequacy" of benefits. A secular employer who thinks
that ERISA preemption is unjust can do very little to change that
situation. In contrast, a Catholic employer must at least ask himself
whether his benefits can be considered "adequate" and his plans "just" if
they preclude the right to 'litigate claims that would otherwise be valid
under state law. Of course, one cannot exclude from this analysis the
important observation that, with all other compensation being equal, a job
265. 1983 Code C. 230, § 2.
266. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR
ALL, in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER - BUILDING
ON ONE HUNDRED YEARS, supra note 8.
267. See generally Gregory, supra note 246, at 149-53 (analyzing ECONOMIC
JUSTICE FOR ALL).
268. ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 20, T 351.
269. National Conference of Catholic Bishops / United States Catholic
Conference, A Fair and Just Workplace: Principles and Practices for Catholic
Health Care, available at httpi//www.nccbuscc.org/sdwp/national/workplace.htm
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that offers ERISA benefits is better than a job that offers no benefits at
all. Indeed, Congress made a secular judgment in favor of limiting
liability in order to prevent secular employers from reaching this
conclusion. Yet, in challenging themselves to provide a "just wage,"
Catholic employers must ask themselves whether an election to operate a
church plan in compliance with the minimum protections which ERISA
affords to employees of secular employers is enough to satisfy the
church's requirement that a wage be just. If Catholic social teachings ask
the Catholic employer to pay his employee a just wage, then the employee
should not have to pay the price exacted by ERISA preemption in order
to secure the employer's promise of employee benefits.
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APPENDIX A: MORTALITY RATES FOR HIV/AIDS, MALARIA AND
LEPROSY
The following data, which were obtained from Table 3 of the 1997-1999
World Health Statistics Annual, indicate that the mortality rates for
HIV/AIDS and malaria in the Americas and in Europe are low in
comparison to those in other regions of the world. In addition, the
mortality rate for leprosy is also substantially lower in the Americas than
in South-East Asia.
Africa Americas Eastern Eurpoe South Western
Mediterranean East Pacific
Asis
HIV/AIDS 1696 17 29 4 324 33
Malaria 472 2 44 0 59 16
Leprosy 0 1 0 0 12 0
See WORLD HEALTH STATISTICS ANNUAL, Table 3, Life
Number of Survivors, and Chances per 1000 of Eventually
Specified Causes, at Selected Ages, by Sex, 1997-1999
nt.who.int/whosis/statistics (last visited Oct. 17, 2000).
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